transportation plan for all sensitive AA&E shipments should enhance their security. The plans would give DoD the opportunity to assess whether security measures are in place and agreed to before transferring custody to the purchasing country. Detailed guidance for writing, submitting, reviewing, and approving transportation plans should also be provided in the SAMM.
Recommendation 3: DoD should consider requiring purchasing countries to vet and approve all commercial carriers that transport unclassified AA&E.
Recommendation 5: DSCA should require overseas Security Assistance Offices (SAOs) to perform random and periodic inspections for shipments moving under the direct control of the purchasing country. DoD should develop a standard checklist for the SAOs to use while performing these inspections.
Recommendation 6: DSCA should consider establishing an internal cell to monitor the movement of sensitive AA&E from origin to destination. This role would be similar to the role the Defense Transportation Tracking System Program Management Office (DTTS PMO) plays in monitoring sensitive AA&E shipments within the continental United States (CONUS) on behalf of the military departments. The new cell could leverage the new Enhanced Freight Tracking System (EFTS) as its primary tool for monitoring sensitive AA&E shipments throughout the FMS transportation process, any intransit visibility (ITV) events that occur during the transportation process (e.g., consolidations, port offloading, and custody transfers), and when the AA&E shipment reaches its final destination and is receipted in DSCA’s Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP). The DSCA cell would be responsible for notifying the military departments of any exceptions or incidents that may occur while the shipment is in transit for their appropriate action.
Recommendation 7: DSCA’s Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) should update its curriculum to cover transportation safety and security in more detail. SAO and purchasing-country personnel should be required to complete the course and receive certification in the safety and security of sensitive AA&E items. Follow-on instruction should be available on-line for continued professional development of personnel from SAOs and other organizations.
A discussion followed regarding the training of foreign militaries in the US and the need to move AA&E to the training locations. Letters of offer and acceptance (LOAs) and transportation plans (TPs) should be required for these missions as well. Although this scenario is outside the scope of FMS, DoD should have oversight of these activities.
Mr. Schutz recommended that OSD TP, LMI, and DSCA meet to determine how to pursue the recommendations in the report.
AA&E Interagency Coordination Group Minutes – June 3, 20085