patients with a dose lower than the 0.8 dose. Bayer also stopped shipping .8mg samples to U.S. doctors (Angelmar, 2007).
On sales of 7, Bayer
August 1, 2001, however, Bayer suspended all marketing and
the 0.8 decided
dose of cerivastatin in the United States.
Following the price fell by
announcement of cerivastatin’s withdrawal, Bayer’s
anticipation of were filed both
lost profits and massive litigation.
claims and those
whose theories of causation were more speculative.
Given the chronology explained above, and other damaging
documents revealed during discovery, plaintiffs could that Bayer concealed information about the dangers of
plausibly argue cerivastatin and
continued to market the drug even after it knew of the dangers.
could argue that it acted as quickly as feasible under the circumstances and that it should not be held responsible for prescribing physicians’ failure to abide by the contraindication for gemfibrozil co-therapy when
prescribing to be large
Nonetheless, Bayer’s liability was expected
Home Products experience with fen-Phen litigation, observers large litigation costs and perhaps attempts to reach a global
settlement with plaintiffs.
Bayer was expected to agree to mass
____________ Bayer did not withdraw cerivastatin from Japan because gemfibrozil was not available there and because the higher dosages of 9
cerivastatin were not sold there. cerivastatin in Japan was .15 mg.
The highest approved dosage of On August 23, 2001 Bayer withdrew
cerivastatin from the Japanese market, partly
10 One damaging internal document stated: “If the FDA asks for bad news, we have to give, but if we don’t have it, we can’t give it to them.” (Berenson, 2003).