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the mililary dcr.ciencies the)' m:ognlled in the i5

_

l a n d s , b o t h M a r s l l a l l a n d H e l ' 1 O l 1 w e r e

with the

Hawaiian Dcfnnmem's

10 lhe alen. (I I )

AI the eI'\d of 1940 an unexpected problem on the Nav)' side of the Hawaiian scene InterTU(Ud War Dcpartmcnl plans forthe islands. Thesudden reliefof the PacifIC fleet rommander folted Genenl MmluU to oonsider achange II Fan SlIaner. General Herron would SOOIl n:1Ch thc rcliremcntale. and nthcr than leave him to esLablisli relations wiLli. new admiral shonly before lIis own relief and then expcc1 Ills S'!(N"ssor U) repeal thc pmceu I few monLhi Iller, Marshall preferred II) appointsomconc with the pros. pcclofJon&eYlty In thc islands. Thus. mostofthe wonr. of reinron;lnl the Hawlilan Dcpulment fell to Lt. Gen.. WallerC. Shon. who tookrommandon 8 Feb<\! ary 1941. (12)

Whoever commanded either thc Anny or Navy romponcnt of 10 outposl in 1941had 10 work with a delicate command amllOgcmcr1. that represelned an uruealisti<: .LCn1pt 10 rontain the dcbllilailng iofiu encc of inlersc....ice rivalry. Hawall.litc every DIller OUIpOSI in 1941. wasl"t wo-hcaded"rommand. Neither the senior Army nor Nav)' officcr on the scene com manded the oLher. Both ,....,," copcc:ted 10 command "by mutual Ci)l)pCl'lItion," as lhe joint plan 5Wed It.

Thus.

outpostoomm.ros remained

hosugc to the chemisll)' of persona/ily. Whc:nc:vcr OUlpost oomman<.krs QIOe due for IUUlion.lhe: Army

Iri, Nay), rounlerpao great care in selecting replacements. 8UI 00l even

chosen offiCCTli could always make the 1,,'0- headed system work. A few months bc:fore Marshall SCIlI Shor1 to Hawaii. iTuerservlce rivalry h.1d namlon Lhe Paci flc $idcorthe P3lWlI1 Canal overthc appropri. lie ICSpOIISC to I possible submarine sighting. (13)

Gen::ral Shor1 faced a mullllucScofproblctm3g3inst

a backdropofgrowing

In a teLler

ID the new commander in HawaII. Marshall underlined the minion in Ibwaii.dcscribcd brieny the f>adlic Fleet commander SIIoon would I\3ve ID worlo: with. Adm. Husband E. Kimmel. lind delliled the problems he f:lCed in mnfOOn, H,....,ii. Mm.h.all ·s

as=enl was bleak., for aillime when the

was

pressing the

10 improvc

11 aU neel

the War Department was deve oplnl the eighl Carihbran sites acquired from the 8riLish in the

1940 dc:stroyen-for-baIcs dell, as well as sharing weapons prod1Ktion with the 8rilish and RlIs sians. Neyen.hclcss. MalSbaJl would try 10 &end]1 P

]6sin \wowcdcsand 5OnewerP-4Qs within

(t4)

Afler inspectin, his new axnm3lld, Short lisled

for Mmhall the priorities I'e would addren. At the top of his lisl was eooperalion with the Withi n two momhs he made sllnincant progress wiLli his IWO COWl\eTparts, Founeenth Naval District commandant ReM Adm_a,udec. Bloch and Admir3.1 Kimmd. In Mmh Short and Bloch IlreedOlllcommand arrange

ment for joint air optr<1ltiOO$.

If airer:lft of the IWO

$trvias auacked "hoSIile suffICe

the

would command: if Lhey opctaled "over and in the Immediate vkinily of Oahu." the Army would com mand_ Funher, if the Navy needod ISSlswa in carrying OUt lIS minion ofdi:stant rcc:omaissmce from Oahu, the would mak." IYailabk tome of its ain;f1In. 10 Aprit Shon and 810ch agreed on a "loinl Coastal Frontier Defense Plan." a lengthy documenl whkh. ;goon&: oLhcr proyiSioru:, detailed Anny and NiVy responsibililieJ. Marshall founrJ these 19n::e ments and wrote Shon, "11 is evident that )'0\1 hIVe b<x:n on the job. and I know thal lhe: Nay)' is Iklightcd to llave soch acncrous CDOpcf1llion.M ( IS)

Shoo had OlOresucoess than his

with

ciyilian IIlwa;i.

E1ccled offkials invited Shon 10

address the leniLoriallcg;slalUte In April, and he lOOk lhl' opponuniLy lOou!linc his yiews on civllilll panici pillion in dc:fense of the islands. Shon', p!\lposals were incorpomed intO I MobiliZDion BiU. 50011 cnaaed by the Ic&:isllll.uo:. which proykied for asct aside land procram 10 produce fnod ttScrves and inlCgr.Jtion of cjyilian Icgal and medical ICSOIITCd with lho:ic of thc Hawaiian Depanmcnl in ca!IC of

emergeoc),. (16)

Shon spenL moS! of his lime ltte/Igthening Ihe H.waiian Depanmcfll"s combal power. This cHon

implied

sqw;ak IUks. 0I05t or which Shoo

had listed for MarslWl below inlef'S(:rvk:e CODpI:r.uiOll in his rim monlllin Hawaii, llIcsc Included conslruction projects and a I'CqUC$l for cngineer lroops

to carry lhem out.

on consllUCllnn was made

diffkuhbybolh IIIndingand personrcl problems. The WarDcpartmenthad

tnmm;nlcr. Bd....een FcbnWy and December 1941. Shon re Q\lC$tcd a 100al of S22,9S3.691 but received 001)' S35O.000 for nud Improvement. an IIppmpri;ttion nte ofbl.n:ly I.S pcra:f11. The response to Shon's requests forpcrsonncl waseyen worse. No addiLional engineer

u.nits had arriyed

the end ofNoycmbcr. (17)

rundlnl and pcrwnncl probIetm. Sho<I

was able 10

much in llre:ngthming de

feoscs. Usin, Infanlry troopS as cnlineers and mate-

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