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rials setlSldc or the Worts Progress Administration. he buill aircraft revetments and field fortifications. bombprooJcd repairshops. improved mills. UId length c:ncd airfields. He used eompanies UId INaalions or the 299Ih InFUltry.lllwlii N:ulonal Guud.to p!Tison outlying islands. lie g&inocl authority to transFMm \he square fOOT_regiment Uawaiian Division Into I_tri_ angular divisions of three reJ:iments each UId divided respoosibilily (or the ddtnse: of Oahu between the r=liting 24th and 25th Divisions. (111)

Of all the miliL1ry projmJ III " 'hleb soon gave ancntioo. nol1C m:cived more lime than the aircraft warning service. To protect the Islands agaillllt air anack. Short envisioned an alr.ground ageney that would perform th= functions: delecr. the approachof enemy ain.:rafL;!\en coast anlllery batteries trod pyr suil sQndrons. and cornmI anliaircraft lire Ind the movement of friendly alreraft against cnemy fon::es. The antiaireraft weaponry and aireraft Oil hand in Hawaii It the beginnil\i o( the year n:presenlC'd a UM:ful. thlugh small ;md obsol=m, founo;tation for the aircraf! warning service. AceordinglO reinForce ment programs to be compleled in the fin>! half of 1942. Short would have 345 ..s!kalibcrmachine guns; in November 1941 hc had 180. Hc ordertd 140 31- mm. gullll. but Iud only 20. And he Ol'Ikred 24 ofthc new90-mm. guM but neverltttivro Illy. 'The main_ Slay of Shon'l antiaircraft defcnse: remainocl S6 00ri0- kle 3-ioch gum. In aircraft. Shon was promi5cd 360 fighter plllTlC$ bul had lOS at his airfoclds. lie on:lered

184 R-11 bombers but Iud 12. Recause of a JIilIl.S shorIage througtout the Anny. only SO fightelS lind 6

B.17$ were


To improve the aircraft situation, Shon Willi count ing on Mar=ohlll'5 promi:o;e or 55 P-40s and 3' ]715 ....hen production increased. Ncvcrthdc:!III.. Mar=oh3l1 sent HaWllii coough older P-36ii and early vCl'llions of the P..o4Q for Short to 3dd at10Ihcr pursuit &rouP 10 the

al r force he inherited from Iknon. Thus. the JJlwalian air fore<: in the finol week of December had two hnmbardmcnt and two pursuit IImuJll. (20)

Shon also made I

$lart on the crucial COfItro]

element of his "reran warning 5lervice.. DeJlilnmCllt si,...a] ;n1 air otroce<s planned an interceptor com· mand to COfItml Intiaireraft fire and pyrsuit ain.:raft "ainst approaching enemy squadrons. Be cau:o;e the Interc<:plor wmm:lTld could call on Navy aircraft Ifneeded, as provided for in the Shon_R1och joint airagreement. itlud 10deal withthc delicate iSSIIC ofinkrwrvlce relations. To minimize thc poIt:ntia] for disruption of a C:OOnlinated effort by the two services.


Shnn began holding air defensedrills with the Navy in the fall of 194 L (21)

1lIe key to the suroess of the aircT1.ft wmling

service was early detection. but througtout 19411his remained the weakest componcrl of the system. 1lIe SCR-270(mobik) and SCR-271 radu systems dcve]oped in the late 19305 offertd the promJ:o;e of detection 10 about ISO miln. Impressed by radar tests in the Panama Canal area. Short onkl'td six mobile and sil filed 9CU. But shifting priorilies in re.<opon..-.e to evenlll in Europe and the western Pacific slowed Hawaiian reinforcement in the atter half of 1941 so seriousLy that by the fil'i\l of DecemberShort had only five mobile m;a.rsets Ln operable condition bo.at no


and pam for three or the liled 1!CtS.

though sites forthc laner were not finished. (22)

While plannin& his lireraft WlIImin, 5lervice. Short

ran Into

from another U.S. government

agtncy. 1lIe NatiOllllI Park service vetoed one of his dIoices of aradar site and service. road on the grounds that construction would ruin IScenie view. It took the pcnoru.l intervention of General Mar=ohall with the sccmary ofthe intcrior to restore the radar lrmallation

program in Hawaii. (23) Although the Hawaiian Departmc:M


the CTli:illCCT and eoa5W artillery troops Short re· quested early in the year, the command ...,rovcQ a

,rowin, number of men

by the I1CW SdcC1ive

scrviceSyslcm. Byt/le Depanmcnt was the

the Hawaiian command in the

Anny, whhmorethan3S,OC(Ilroops. and WarDcpan· menl plans ealled for building up to the authorized SlIC1'1g1h ofSH.IXX)by thc middle of 1942. But increu ing streflgth 00 paper did not immclli:llely translate Into Increasing oombat capability. for many ofthc new men arriving in Hawailllad not completed basic tra;n in, eydes. Thus.;o additioo III his official mi55ions, Shon Iud 10 assume the unofficial missioo ofCOI1lplct· inS the inlerruptN tninlng or new mw. (24)

Even in secure

the execution of

minions can streICh TC5()urcesl" the limit. But in 1941

in SltolICgie priorities and 3dditlonaL missions reducC'd the Hawaiian l:'kpaTtmt'nt's abili,y 10 carry out its primary mlssloo. In the Spring, to protect Und Lease shlpmwts to Britain. President Roooeveit di I«led a shift ofollc-quartcr of the: PiClfic Fleet to the Atlantic Fk:ct. For the Anny in lIawali. this Atlantic emphasis presenled two unwelcome developments: dclJ)'$ in eonstruclion .nd weapons, because of the prionty given thc new Caribbean bases, and 'lOS! of expected ailCraft. Early in the year Marshall had

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