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6 / 44

promised Hawaii 35 new 8 · 17 bombers.

ccived 21 in May; the

went 10 the Atlantic.

Late In the summe:r, Iller the Japanese occupied French Indochina, anxhc:r cllange of priorities In



In HawaiI.

The: War Dcpanmc:m ch.anged its strate&ie view of the Philippines from I throwaway outpost In the path of e_pccted Japanc.sc aggression to akeystone posicion in theeont.inmenl0f Japan. As I rcsuh, the WarDc pan. ment Jave the: Philippines a higllcr prlorhy for rein. fo :::t:ment than Hawaii. In addition to the of priority, Shon lost 9 more D·1 7s to the Philippines, luving him with 12 on papa. Beside! losses, Shon's ai r fon:e W<IiI given the: ;tdditional mi$$iOll of trainin, 8 · 17 crews for the bYildup of Ocncral MaeArthur'. ai r force. For this new minion, Shon rcoeived no new lin;:raft, which meant hi, 6 8 .171

no longer Iv.ilable toaugrnent distant Qna: by the Nlvy. Thus, the promise from Marshall for 35 8·17s IIad hecomc: the reallty In July In

of6 IH75 on the runways. (26)

As importiUlt 10 m Anny

as modem "'1:ap.

onry W;L'i accurate intelligence. While the [kpanment lahored 10 enhanee enmll:lt power, the command a150 had to remain ready to amwer any



from the


Shan and

his su.ff




mMI likely adVCIUry. depended on the War about Jap.1rlC$C f(ll"Oe$.


kept al ive on a largerseale the danaers of

Inlemrvia rlvalry t1w SOOn and hi' St.llf thought they NIl Wldcrcontrol hecause, ofC1l\II"Se, the Navy In lIawail InleUigenoefrom Itso........ SOUTCd. A.s the months passed in 1941, the danger manifC5ted


In. series 0( critical rlICSS3gcs .!em .fICr

Japanese fOfCeS occupied Indochina in July. differem situation CSlimatcs bccll1lc especially obvious. These diITcrcrlOCS CUlminatoo on 27 Novcmber, wilen !he War and Navy DcpartmCnlS sent to their OU1pos1


thtly intcodoo as war

ll1e Navy left no room 10 doubt the p!I!pOSe o f

The: first SCnlencc Iud: ''This be eonsItkml a war warning." (27)

i$ to

In contr.m, the WarOcpanmff\l sent Shorumild summvy of m:cnt diplom3£)' thai lions with the Japanese appear to be IerminalCd 10 all

pt;Icticai p!I!pOSes with only the barest

tNt the

Government might come blck IIId

offe r tocontinlX. MThe: me:ssage oontinlXd in 'CUrious pJ.iring of positive and negatiye directions IIlat tIrTled

it a

would embamlss the War Dcp.llnmel11

for years:

the " Do·Don·''"

For uample,


Shan "'"as IOId 10 "undenake such ra:onnaiSltanC(: and

measures IS you dttm

Illn 1"00( 10

the civil population.M

"disclose inlent" or

show the ml'SS3gC to Illy bYt "'minimum essential ofYken..M Both Shan and Kimmel n;ad each other'S messages, and both put them down WQndcring which

accurately rdlecled differem degrees of

thinking urgency

in Washington.


conveyed by the:


mad-e difficult. ifoot Imll »l "lib1e. an elfco.;.

live Joll11

In lIawaii. (28)

SIlon studied the: amhiguhies of the 0<>-000'1

mc:5S8gc. Three more:

about sabulagc reo

ceived within days convinced him thal the Wlr Dc partment believed sabotlae the gn:atest danger he

fxed, SIlon pul his command on an


and OOIlIinued essentialtr:linina and conSirudion. (29)

The supreme ICSI o f lIawaii:sn Dl:p.1rtmcro1-i1nd


came:, o f C1l\IISe, on 7 Dc· By any measure. the Anny OIUpost.

failed in its mission 10 prou:a the I\IIvai bIl.sc and ships in pon .md CYnl its own posts and .ir bQses.. In the nation's most sp:clacular military defeat. the !'xilic fleet lost the ofitl baule line and was effectively disabled for six months. The Ha....aiian Dcp.:lMmem lost over half of its aln;l1Il"t and. worst o f all, 683

casualties, 232 of them killoo. (0)

Clwlgc came: rapidly [or the Haw,iian Dcp.1 ment In the last thrtt wcckllo[ 194 1. The tWO·headed command arrangement wu immedillcly abolished, with aU units in the islandl I"OOW under the new Com· m;nicr·in·OUef. Pleinc, Admiral Olellcr W. Nim· i17MThe Hawliian Dl:panmemgOl lnewcommanding general. LL Gen. [klos C. Emmons. 111 upcricna:d li r Ornett, and unlimited fundln, fOf accc:kraLed rein rorcenteTIL (31)

The Pearl

aI!It.) pruvoked change in

thelongertcnn, forhot/1 the Anny and the nalion. The:

defeat soowed mIl the emphasis in

Hjl wjlii3ll

reinforcement effort II:.od been misplaced.

Rather than numbers and t)"pcs of weapons and air· ellln. the critical clement In the effectiveness ur thtl outp(l$t in 1941 wn infomutlnn. On several occa· sions in the !ancr half of thai yev, mishmdlcd infor· mation misled o fficial.• in both and Washing· ton about theeapahililY ancI pn:pan:d11l;$S of Anny and Navy forocs. Roth Soon :and the Wu Dtpanmcnt ovt:restimOlCd the ability of thc Navy 10 detect and intercq:w:enemy taSk forcel . Kimmel and 81ochthoughl the Department WlS on • full alen stalU5 after Short received thc 27 November waming. A second warning mcss;!I.'C from Marshall might have

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