136. The Trenwick Companies had an attorney-client relationship Baker and accountant-client relationships with [Ernst & Young]
with and with
Milliman. As such, these entities are held to the standard of care would be exercised by reasonably prudent professionals in their fields. that 143
137. The Professional Defendants breached their duties of care by failing to act with the diligence required and/or providing representation that lacked the minimum degree of skill, prudence[,] and knowledge. Specifically, the Professional Defendants breached their duties of care by helping to conceal the true financial condition of the Trenwick Companies, manipulating the valuation and reserve levels of various of these companies, and/or signing off on the legitimacy of the transactions in question. Milliman further breached its duty of care by certifying the reserve levels at Chartwell in 1999. 144
138. As a result of the Professional Defendants’ negligence, [Trenwick America] suffered injury for which Plaintiff seeks recovery. 145
At bottom, the complaint simply alleges that big-dog advisors were on the scene
when Trenwick acquired Chartwell and LaSalle, that Trenwick ultimately failed, and that
in the post-Enron era, big-dog advisors should pay when things go wrong with their
clients, even when a plaintiff cannot articulate what it is that the advisors did that was
intentionally wrongful or even negligent.
Each of the defendant advisors has moved to dismiss the complaint against it on
various grounds. I grant those motions for reasons that will be stated tersely.
First, because the complaint fails to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
against the Trenwick or Trenwick America directors, the claims that the defendant