in the United States, Europe, and the Persian Gulf. When the war ended, Army Guard
units had made their mark, with one exception. The Army’s decision not to deploy three
mobilized Roundout brigades to Southwest Asia caused many Guard members to
question the Army’s commitment to the Total Force.
In the decade following the Persian Gulf War, the Total Force Policy achieved
significant results despite increased tensions between the active duty military and the
reserve components that resulted primarily from huge, across the board cuts in manpower
and force structure. In the Army Guard, the termination of the Roundout Brigade
Program and lingering resentment over the handling of the Roundout brigades in the
previous war further embittered Army-Guard relations. However, the Army and ARNG
leadership fully cooperated in two important Total Force initiatives; the deployment of
peacekeepers around the globe and the creation of new capabilities for homeland security
against threats from rogue nations and terrorist organizations. Meanwhile, the ANG
continued to tailor its force structure for all types of combat and support missions and
assumed the primary responsibility for the air defense of the continental United States.
The National Guard fully supported the Defense Department’s Partnership for Peace
Program by establishing direct military-to-military contacts with emerging democracies
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics.
The war on terrorism has so far demonstrated the many positive aspects of the
Total Force Policy. The increased levels of readiness that have enabled Guard members
to defend the American homeland and to participate fully in the campaigns in
Afghanistan and Iraq are a direct result of Total Force initiatives. At the same time,
many important questions have surfaced regarding the Total Force Policy’s continued