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in the United States, Europe, and the Persian Gulf. When the war ended, Army Guard

units had made their mark, with one exception. The Army’s decision not to deploy three

mobilized Roundout brigades to Southwest Asia caused many Guard members to

question the Army’s commitment to the Total Force.

In the decade following the Persian Gulf War, the Total Force Policy achieved

significant results despite increased tensions between the active duty military and the

reserve components that resulted primarily from huge, across the board cuts in manpower

and force structure. In the Army Guard, the termination of the Roundout Brigade

Program and lingering resentment over the handling of the Roundout brigades in the

previous war further embittered Army-Guard relations. However, the Army and ARNG

leadership fully cooperated in two important Total Force initiatives; the deployment of

peacekeepers around the globe and the creation of new capabilities for homeland security

against threats from rogue nations and terrorist organizations. Meanwhile, the ANG

continued to tailor its force structure for all types of combat and support missions and

assumed the primary responsibility for the air defense of the continental United States.

The National Guard fully supported the Defense Department’s Partnership for Peace

Program by establishing direct military-to-military contacts with emerging democracies

in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics.

The war on terrorism has so far demonstrated the many positive aspects of the

Total Force Policy. The increased levels of readiness that have enabled Guard members

to defend the American homeland and to participate fully in the campaigns in

Afghanistan and Iraq are a direct result of Total Force initiatives. At the same time,

many important questions have surfaced regarding the Total Force Policy’s continued

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