pressure, rather than in more formal ways.
The second source of legitimacy is law. In traditional international law, those entities that are neither states nor international organizations – such as firms and private associations – are subject to the laws of the states possessing jurisdiction. But states, and in some instances non-state actors, also can be held to standards articulated in international law. Human rights treaties and the statute of the International Criminal Court constitute obvious examples: states and their leaders can be held accountable for violations of their provisions. The World Trade Organization issues rulings binding on states, which must often, in order to comply, enact or alter domestic laws or regulations applying to firms and their transactions. Even if no treaty provisions cover a situation, international law includes a category of jus cogens – peremptory norms, such as norms against piracy, whose violation justifies legal accountability. Finally, customary international law reflects state practice “accompanied by the conviction that it reflects a legal obligation,” known as opinio juris (Malanczuk 1997: 44).
For international organizations, to whom authority is formally delegated, legitimacy depends on some combination of conformity to shared norms and to established law. In this case, the predominant legal instruments are charters or articles of agreement which specify the procedures by which they have to act to make their rulings authoritative, defining what is often referred to as “input” or “process” legitimacy. Equally important, however, the charters of international organizations typically specify, in general normative terms, their purposes. The United Nations was formed “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” as well as to promote fundamental human rights, create the conditions for justice, and promote social progress (United