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relic of the 'old Europe'.

C) With an existing strong influence on banking and fiscal affairs, it is possible that certain threat perceptions of German power might arise in France and England (Rothwell 1989, p21). However, with the level of high integration of Germany into the broader European economy, Germany has had to play a highly cooperative role within these debates. After initial resistance to German unification, this was the path France took in 1990, seeking to embed Germany in a deepening European integration (Paterson & Smith, in Smith 1992, p16). Germany has certainly been one of the main supporters for the project of European Monetary Union and the euro, even though she had her own very strong currency (see Zimmermann 2001). Yet fears of German economic domination remain in segments of European populations, e.g. in Britain, Belgium, Holland and Switzerland. Likewise, integration of Germany into any new shared European security and defence identity will need careful management.

D) In the long term, an increasingly important place for Germany in the EU and in Eastern European affairs. The US rapidly developed a policy which accepted the move towards unification, but placed it within a broader dialogue on security, including an emphasis on the continued role of Germany within NATO (Moens 1991, pp542-3). A broadening and expanding role for NATO allows Germany to seem less threatening. Germany remains deeply important for Eastern Europe as a whole, being a strong investor and trading partner, and the main country promoting rapid expansion eastwards for the EU and NATO (see in detail Thompson 2001; Phillips 2001). Germany is also a crucial player in the European Defense Initiative, though the UK and France have taken on a strong leadership role in this area. Likewise, there were plans to set up a new headquarters ("multinational deployable force headquarters") in support of this agenda, coordinated by a meeting of leaders from France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg during early May 2003, and established through early 2004. In large measure, the UK has used this process to ‘buy into’ the Franco-German ‘motor’ of Europe, but has had to try and put it pre-emptive engagement in Iraq behind it in recent trilateral meetings, though the UK still refuses to ‘choose’ between Europe and an Atlanticist policy as an ally of the US (see below; Strategic Comments 2004).  

E) Poland, too, was extremely concerned about territorial claims, since large parts of east German territory had been acceded to her in settlements after the end of World War II (Rothwell 1990c, p28), but in the end the Bonn government agreed that no claims would be made. A treaty guaranteeing existing borders with Poland was signed on 14 November 1990 (Paterson & Smith, in Smith 1992, p19), while the German government has not attempted to lay any claims to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic coast, a region which had once been part of east Prussia and remains of extreme strategic importance to Russia (Schlor 1993, pp48-9), which has been charged with the possible moving nuclear weapons into the enclave in 2000-2001, and tightening border controls around the enclave as the EU expands through 2004. Former Chancellor Kohl took a very strong role in supporting the revival of Poland, and was the strongest supporter of Polish entry into the EU and NATO. As such, he was sometimes dubbed as the 'chancellor of reconciliation' (United Press International 2000). Through the 1997-2004 period Germany remained one of the strongest trading and planning partners with Poland, with increasing confidence in German-Polish relations in spite of some remaining sensitivities from the past (Thompson 2001). Through 2001, 31% of Polish exports and 26% of Polish import were directed to or from Germany (DFAT 2003). Through 2003-2004 there has been some support from Germany and the UK for Poland’s wish to play a stronger role in the EU as one of the larger new member states, though Poland is critical of too much power being held by the European ‘big three’ (Strategic Comments 2004).

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