F) Germany, however, has had to make serious efforts to make itself less threatening to its neighbours. Once again, the expansion of the EU and NATO eastwards has reduced some of the direct threats to German security. However, modernisation of German military capability has continued through 2001-2004, along with the ability to operate 'out-of-area' in NATO operations. Likewise, if Germany wishes to play a stronger role in the UN and the European Defense Initiative, Germany has had to revise its military doctrine and develop a force more capable professional army of projecting force overseas. This was based on a greater role in peace-keeping and related operations (East Timor and Afghanistan), and a more assertive role in the use of German airpower in the airwar in Kosovo and against former Yugoslavia (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2003, p104). This trend, however, has clear limits, e.g. Germany needs these operations to be multilateral and mandated either through UNSC or NATO agreements. Likewise, from 2001-2002 Germany was willing to mobilise its forces in the fight against international terrorism, in part under the collective defence arrangements of article 5 of the NATO alliance. Under a cabinet-proposed plan for the use of German forces in the fight against international terrorism approved by parliament on November 16, 2001 up to 3,900 military personnel could be mobilised for Operation Enduring Freedom, including 250 medical evacuation personnel. However, Germany remains critical of unilateral or alliance interventions that do not have strong international backing and a sound plan for post-conflict reconstruction, a lesson that has been learnt from stabilization plans for the Balkans area (discussed further in lecture 10).
G) In general terms, the Czech Republic is likely to continue to have complex relations with Germany - it needs her economic help and trade, but in the past Czechoslovakia engaged in intense phases of de-Germanification and persecutions of Germans at the end of World War II, with the removal of many Sudeten Germans from border areas (Rothwell 1990c, p28; Wallace et al. 2002). Mutual tensions with the Czech Republic have been reduced through mutual apologies concerning negative treatments of citizens in World War II. Likewise, there has been vigorous reappraisal of Germany's Nazi past, including the use of slave labour during World War II. The path out of these tensions has been adopted by all the main parties: to see a united Germany 'firmly attached to Western Europe, entrenched within the European Community' (Rothwell 1990c, p28). Relations between Germany and the Czech Republic are now strong, but individual German claims for repatriation of lands or houses lost at the end of World War II have not been solved in the bilateral relationship (see Thompson 2001; Wallace et al. 2002). This process will be partly resolved as EU expands to include these countries in 2003, since ‘Once the Czech Republic and Slovakia join, all E.U. citizens - including former refugees in neighboring countries - will have the right to live in their former homelands’ (Wallace et al. 2002). Likewise, German monetary funds created for compensation to slave labour utilized in Europe (and Eastern Europe in particular) during World War II has not met all demands due to the problem of providing proof of events so long ago and slow processing (see Schmidt 2001).
H) The German response to fears of increased German power-potential has been to emphasis Germany's constructive role within a broader Europe, and to position most of its foreign affairs arrangements within the context of multilateral arrangements (Schlor 1993, p4). Some exceptions have occurred, e.g. Germany's early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991 may have helped unbalance efforts to arrive at a common European response to the Balkans crisis (Schlor 1993, p3). Furthermore, some analysts note that Germany is now fulfilling its central role in central Europe, e.g. the liberal daily newspaper Seuddeutsche Zeitung in 1989 noted that 'Courted by both world powers, the political dwarf, West Germany is waking up and growing into its normal size as the central power in Europe' (Weekend Australian 1989; see further Schlor 1993; Thompson 2001). Negative features of some kind of Central Europe dominated by German