unilateral policies has not developed. German power remains engaged in multilateral fora such as the EU, NATO, UNSC and the G8. This, in part, explains tensions with the US and UK through 2003, since German foreign policy remains deeply committed to multilateral operations, rather than unilateral coalitions or ad hoc coalitions. Though there was some softening of these tensions through 2004 as the U.S. sought to re-engage both the UN on the Iraq issue, and to repair some bridges with France, this has not resulted in a clear agreement on either the use of force, or on the difficult issue of burden sharing after interventions occur.
I) Continued engagement of US as a guarantee of European security had remained an element of wider German policy, at least through 2001, (Thompson 2001; Hertkorn 2001) and means that repairing links with the US will remain important in the future. This relationship, however, has not gone entirely smoothly through 1999-2004, due to tensions over environmental policies, missile defense programs, and the Iraq war (see below). On this basis, the world may already be in a post-Atlanticist phase even if this is not clear to the UK. On this basis, US-German relations are crucial for the wider pattern of cooperation between the U.S. and the EU (discussed further in later lectures).
J) The German capital returned from Bonn to a united Berlin, which underwent massive rebuilding projects to make it a suitable centre for government (see Lawday 1999). Most government ministries had moved to the new capital as of 2000. The new Berlin, however, remains a fascinating mix of urban cultures in which 'wessies' and 'ossies' have not fully integrated. Artists and intellectuals speak of the 'wall in the head' which divides these groups. Revival of the old capital has proved problematic, with ongoing funding and social problems (see Deutsche Welle 2002b). The capital also included plans for a controversial holocaust museum that has tried to deal with the problems of the past, though some see this as part of the philosophy of 'build a monument and forget about it' approach (Haas 2002, p170).
K) German government support 2003-2004 for moves toward a coherent EU Constitution that would replace the current web of Treaties and Intergovernmental Treaties that creates a mixed supranational and inter-system system for the EU, a move that would also clarify voting rights and the use of qualified majority voting the expanded EU, give the EU a legal ‘personality’, and create an individual European President (elected by EU leaders to chair meetings and represent the EU, a distinct role form President of the European Commission and the president of the European parliament) and foreign minister, and a stronger EU foreign affairs capacity. Through June 2004 intense debate was underway, and getting close to agreement on some of these issues through 17 June, with basic agreement on 22 June 2004 on the 350 pages of agreements. However, sceptics have viewed the constitution, put forward for government debate from late 2003, as divisive, splitting Europe, and essentially strengthening the power of a non-transparent, bureaucratic Brussels with a ‘democratic deficit’, a view aired in popular newspapers in England, Germany and Italy (BBC 2004a; Evans-Pritchard 2004a).
J) A more coherent EU, it was argued by German foreign affairs minister, Joschka Fischer, could lead to a new governance trilateralism, balancing the U.S. on one side, a new Europe on the other, and a reinvigorated UN system in the middle. Such a vision might also involve Germany taking on a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Moreover, ‘ . . . for the UN to play its role as sole provider of legitimacy, without which international political action is doomed to fail, the institution and its main decision-taking body, the Security Council, must be made to reflect the transformations brought by decolonisation, the end of the cold war and globalisation.’ (Benoit 2004)
4. New Directions and Challenges under the leadership of Gerhard Schroeder