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Manufacturer could illegally boost its market share within a therapeutic class, were called

"Market Share Agreements" or "Reimbursement Agreements."

59.

Relator Lisitza was forced to participate in a number of these schemes during his

tenure as a pharmacist and as a supervisor of other pharmacists at Omnicare.

60.

Omnicare's

highly-touted "Therapeutic

Interchange" program IS

theoretically

meant to facilitate legal, properly authorized switches between medications within a therapeutic

class for the sole purpose of benefiting patient health and wellbeing. See Omnicare website,

http://www.omnicare.com/geriatric.asp (emphasizing patient wellbeing and payor savings as the

reasons for Omnicare's use of therapeutic interchange.) However, by entering into a Market

Share Agreement with Omnicare, each Defendant Manufacturer co-opted this program and

facilitated Omnicare's mass switching, often to drugs that are more expensive for payors or to

drugs

which

have

no

benefit,

and

even

jeopardize,

patients'

health.

Effectively,

Defendant

Manufacturers bought their way onto Omnicare's "preferred" medication list, purely focusing on

maximizing profits with no thought to patient wellbeing or the impact the switches would have

on government and private insurance payors.

A.

THE MARKET SHARE AGREEMENTS

61.

Relator Lisitza first became aware of the kickbacks-for-switches schemes when

Bristol Myers entered into a Market Share Agreement with Omnicare for the promotion of

Monopril.

Monopril

is

classified

as

an

ACE

inhibitor,

a

therapeutic

class

of

medications

prescribed to treat high blood pressure and congestive heart failure. Competing drugs in this

therapeutic class include Capoten (captopril), Vasotec (enalapril), and Accupril (quinapril),

among others.

16

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