additional names, dates, times, and places relating to the negotiation and implementation of the
illegal Market Share Agreement is solely within the possession of Bristol Myers and Omnicare,
Lisitza's superiors conceded the existence, implementation, and financial impact of the Monopril
Market Share Agreement to Lisitza and instructed him about what he was required to do to
accomplish the financial objective ofthe Monopril Market Share Agreement.
thousands of prescriptions switched pursuant to the Monopril Market Share Agreement.
Bristol Myers worked with other large entities who dispensed pharmaceuticals,
including dispensing pharmacies, pharmacy benefit managers, and hospitals, to illegally gain
market share for Monopril in the ACE inhibitor market through illegal kickbacks-for-switches
schemes similar to the one effected with Omnicare. The specific circumstances alleged herein
evidence a pattern of conduct by Bristol Myers designed to maximize profits through this scheme
at every 0ppOliunity, through various other drugs and other providers.
AFTER THE SUCCESS OF THE BRISTOL MVERSIMONOPRIL PAL PROGRAM, OTHER DEFENDANT MANUFACTURERS ENTER INTO SIMILAR SCHEMES WITH OMNICARE WITH SIMILAR RESULTS AND RISKS
The mechanics of the Bristol Myers/Omnicare scheme set the framework for
subsequent schemes entered into by the other Defendant Manufacturers and Omnicare. In each
case, a drug within a commonly prescribed therapeutic class - antibiotics for bedsores and other
infections, blood pressure and cholesterol medications, antipsychotics for dementia - became a
"preferred" medication because a Defendant Manufacturer paid bribes to make it so,
notwithstanding the cost to the government or the impact on the patient's health.