effected with Omnicare. The specific circwnstances alleged herein evidence a pattern of conduct
by Pfizer designed to maximize profits through this scheme at every opportunity, through various
other drugs and other providers.
DEFENDANT MANUFACTURER PFIZER AND OMNICARE ENTER INTO A MARKET SHARE AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO ACCUPRIL
As the market for illegal switching schemes began to mature, Omnicare realized it
had the opportunity to force Defendant Manufacturers to bid against one another to become the
preferred drug within a particular therapeutic class. Hardball tactics in these negotiations were
disguised as ongoing clinical research. While Omnicare might have a kickbacks-for-switches
scheme with one Defendant Manufacturer, it would institute a research study with a drug in the
same therapeutic class made by a second Defendant Manufacturer. These research studies were
designed to force the first Defendant Manufacturer to provide greater rebates when it came time
to renegotiate the Market Share Agreements.
convince its front line staff, its consultant pharmacists, and physicians that Monopril was truly
the best ACE inhibitor, it turned out upon the expiration of the Bristol Myers/Monopril Market
Share Agreement that Pfizer had a better financial offer. Therefore, Pfizer bought its way onto
the list as Omnicare's preferred ACE inhibitor, and the Omnicare-serviced patients who had all
been switched from other ACE inhibitors to Monopril were now switched to Accupril, ptizer's
Pfizer executives at the time period of the development and implementation of the
Accupril scheme included but were not limited to J. Patrick Kelly, Pfizer's then-current Vice
President for Worldwide Marketing, Ken Solomon, and Chris Chapman.