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Case 1:10-cv-00061-GHD-JAD

Document 22

Filed 03/19/2010

Page 3 of 10

law.2 When confronted with a clearly substantial disruptive issue material interference with school

activities, the potential exposure of liability, and the core function of providing a public education

to students, the Defendant District chose to cancel school sponsorship of a social event. The

decision of the Defendant District to avoid controversy that undermined the preservation of order

in the school, substantial disruption and conduct destructive of a proper educational environment by

not sponsoring a prom is authorized by state law and is not a constitutional issue.


Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 65 governs preliminaryinjunctions. A preliminary injunction is a powerful

remedy used sparingly in cases with a set of extraordinary circumstances. In the Fifth Circuit, in

considering whether an exercise of an Article III court’s equitable powers should issue, the court

consults the well-established quantitative test for awarding injunctive relief found in Canal

Authority of the State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F. 2d 567 (5th Cir 1974). Canal Authority is the

preeminent authority on what elements are necessary before a court is in a position to even consider

granting preliminary injunctive relief. These four basic requirements comprise the standard for

issuing a preliminary injunction and must be established by a clear showing by the Plaintiff: (1) a

substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that plaintiff

will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury to the

plaintiff if the injunction is denied outweighs the threatened harm to defendant if the injunction is

granted; and (4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. Burden

of proving that the above prerequisites are met rests with the plaintiff. Further, even if the plaintiff

2In the case of Jane Doe v. San Antonio Independent School District, 197 Fed. Appx. 296 (5th Cir. 2006), the Fifth Circuit found that claims of a student injured outside of school grounds were not actionable under §1983 because the defendants were not under a constitutional obligation to protect the student from the acts of her uncle. Id. at 301. The case of Doe v. Covington County School District, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40245 (S. Dist. Miss. 2009) found that neither the Due Process Clause, nor any recognized exception, provided an actionable constitutional right to protection from nonstate actors.


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