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Plaintiff George Coleman (“Coleman”) brought this action - page 3 / 6

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charge with the EEOC within the statutorily prescribed 300-day

limitations

period;

2)

Coleman

did

not

allege

retaliation

in

his

EEOC charge, and therefore failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies

with

respect

to

this

claim;

3)

Coleman’s

claim

under

Title VII must be dismissed because disability is not a protected

class;

and

4)

punitive

damages

are

not

available

under

the

PHRA.

Under the ADA, Title VII, and PHRA, if a plaintiff fails to

file a charge of discrimination within 300 days after the alleged

unlawful

employment

practice,

his

claim

is

time-barred.

42

U.S.C. §

2000e-5(e);

National

R.R.

Passenger

Corp.

v.

Morgan,

101,

113

(3d

Cir.

536 U.S.

(2002);

913, 925

1997).

Woodson

v.

The

statute

Scott

Paper

accrues

when

Co.,

the

109

F.3d

employee

receives

notice

of

the

unlawful

practice.

Delaware

State

College

v. Ricks

, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980).

Coleman argues the statute of limitations has not yet

accrued because he was not terminated, but was continually

employed by Albertson’s without accommodation of the lifting

restriction.

By

this

logic,

Albertson’s

is

committing

an

on-

going

violation

of

his

rights.

“Mere

continuity

of

employment,

without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of

action

for

employment

discrimination.”

Id.

See

also

Sessa

v.

Sears Roebuck & Co., Inc., No. CIV.A.03-CV-5477, 2004 WL 2203743,

*2

(E.D.Pa.

Sept.

30,

2004).

2

Coleman

received

notice

of

2

Albertson’s also cites to Zdziech v. DaimlerChrysler

Corp., 114 Fed.Appx. 469 (3d Cir. 2004), a non-precedential

opinion.

Although

Zdziech

is

directly

on

point,

the

courts

of

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