space dominance. Similar efforts to crystallize a treaty for cyber attacks have also failed for the same reasons. Like space weapons, Russia has drafted a resolution calling on nations to ban the development and production of information weapons. The U.S. has taken the position that it is premature at this point to discuss negotiating an international agreement on IW, and there has been little support for the Russian initiative to date. Yet, unlike the sophisticated infrastructure and advanced technology needed to develop and deploy space weapons, nearly all nations participate in the Information Age to some degree, while only 30 are in space. Barring a major conflict, most states do not expect or have the resources to be either an attacker or a defender in space in the near future. With information systems though, nearly all states can reasonably expect to be both. This has been shown to be true not only in Estonia, but across the world as cyber attacks continue to proliferate.
Space law provides an example of the principle that an area of the international commons can in fact be regulated to bar the most egregious military weapons systems. The problem with applying such an approach to cyber attacks though is that it is the aggregate scale of seemingly innocent intrusions that can aggregate into the equivalent of a WMD attack. There is no cyber equivalent of a nuclear weapon – no piece of code currently known that can, by itself, bring a country to its knees. Rather, it is the amalgamation of coordinated attacks that can result in a total collapse of infrastructure – a national death by a thousand cuts.
Rather than banning only the most egregious weapons, then, perhaps it is possible to regulate all hacking that could rise to the level of a cyber attack. The Antarctic Treaty System (“ATS”) provides a fruitful analogue of a commons area that has gone the