for cyber attacks, especially those MALTs termed broadly enough to cover all law enforcement investigations.149 The problem with this approach though, would be to treat a cyber attack as analogous to terrorism, meaning the IHL framework drops away unless state-sponsored terrorism is included within the regime.150 There are often no enforceable obligations under these treaties. The U.S. is also a party to more than 100 bilateral extradition treaties. Without such accords national governments often will have neither an international obligation nor the domestic authority to deliver custody of an individual for prosecution.151 These treaties could be evoked to more effectively bring the perpetrators of cyber attacks to justice. As such, international criminal law has a distinct role to play in cyber attacks, a subject that will be returned to in part V.
The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations enshrines the right of inviolability of the premises of a diplomatic mission,152 its archives,153 private residences and property,154 and its communications.155 Applied to cyber law, this regime, then, could protect all communications made to and from government embassies and missions against cyber attack or espionage. In addition, the vast majority of treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation are archetypical examples of agreements that will likely be suspended during an armed conflict.156 Tourism is antithetical to a war zone. Though, most NATO Status of Forces Agreements (“SOFA”) would remain in place during an
149 An example is the US-Canada MALT: Treaty Doc. 100-14; 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. Exec. Rept. 100-28; 100th Cong, 2nd Sess. Exec. Rept 101-10; 101st Cong., 1st Sess. XXIV ILM No. 4, 7/85, 1092-1099.
150 John Murphy, State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political, and Economic Dimensions 128 (1989).
151 DOD, supra note 33.
152 1961 Vienna Convention, Art. 2.
153 1961 Vienna Convention, Art. 24.
154 1961 Vienna Convention, Art. 30.
155 1961 Vienna Convention, Art. 27.
156 DOD, supra note 33.