and promoted ethnic atrocities, by Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.197
States that sponsor or launch cyber attacks designed to produce similar atrocities should also be found liable for this crime. The Russian incitement to the cyber attack on Estonia is well-documented, but since the attack did not result in widespread death and destruction it does not reach this most horrific of international crimes, nor would proving specific intent be a simple matter. It should also be noted that the prevention of incitement to genocide remains muddied by divergent practice and confused jurisprudence.198 Nevertheless the option exists of using the Genocide Convention as a vehicle to bring justice to nations that experience genocide as a result of a massive and deadly state-sponsored IW campaign.
Cyber Attacks and Self-Defense
Provided that the attack is actual or the threat is imminent and without any alternative choice of means, the victim state of a cyber attack may lawfully invoke self-defense to justify reasonable, necessary, and proportional measures to safeguard its security under Article 2(4) if that attack reaches the level of an armed attack.199 Coercion not involving armed force does not violate Article 2(4) or result in action under Article 39. As such, “it does not follow that states may react unilaterally pursuant to Article 51.200 The purpose of this section of the U.N. Charter is the maintenance of international
197 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003); Catharine MacKinnon, International Decision: Prosecutor V. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & NGEZE, 98 A.J.I.L. 325 (Apr. 2004).
198 William Schabas, The Genocide Convention at Fifty, Special Report 41, United States Institute of Peace, Jan. 7, 1999. Available at: . Last visited: 4/18/2008.
199 U.N. Charter art. 2, para 4.
200 Schmitt, supra note 165.