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The capacity for existing treaty frameworks to form a useful legal regime to deal with cyber attacks that do not reach the level of an armed attack may be illustrated by using the Estonian case study.  The attack disrupted the functioning of government, and thus the “safety services” referred to in Article 35 of the ITU.  If Russia were attributed blame for the cyber attack then, it would be in breach of the ITU Charter and Estonia could receive reparations or seek other enforcement actions available under international law.  The Estonian government could also hold liable those companies most affected by cyber attacks if it was determined that these companies were aware of the nefarious activity and did not adequately prepare for or respond to the threat, as the courts in the U.S. have done in the context of copyright infringement.  Similarly Estonia could invoke UNCLOS, since it is a coastal state, which is relevant for its prohibition on staging any attacks that interfere with the security or good order of a coastal state.  An argument could be made that this Article 19 prohibition should also apply to Article 113 claims involving submarine cables.  This would mean that cyber attackers who sent subversive code through submarine cables to a coastal state would be in breach of their customary and international law obligations.  Doubtless code from several of the hundreds of DDOS attacks on Estonia traveled by way of submarine cable at some point in their global journey.  This would also open up another route to reparations and possible sanctions from the UNSC under its Chapter VII authority to regulate breaches of international peace and security.  Finally, Estonia could use MALTs, extradition treaties, and potentially eventually the ICC to bring those responsible to justice in the victim nation if the host nation be unwilling or unable to prosecute those responsible (as was the case with Russia after the Estonian cyber attack).  Together, these widely-adopted treaty

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