comprehensive regime is through a new international accord dealing exclusively with cyber security and its status in international law. A proposal for such an organization is laid out in part VI, but in brief it would include an international body with the power to regulate cyber security reminiscent of the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (“CLCS”) under UNCLOS. However, the U.S. and other advanced nations are on record as opposing such a new treaty at this time. Thus until such an accord becomes politically viable, the extent to which existing treaty systems deal with cyber attacks will be ascertained. To that end this paper will examine the most apt analogue in international law to form an appropriate legal regime for cyber attacks – whether it is humanitarian law (laws of war), human rights law (regulation of nation states behavior), or some novel combination of these and other treaties. In framing this regime, it will be argued that cyber attacks represent a threat to international peace and security as daunting and horrific as nuclear war. Yet the nuclear non-proliferation model is not a useful analogy since the technology necessary to conduct IW is already widespread in the international community.
Consequently, this paper will analyze existing international treaty systems to determine the extent to which such regimes are applicable to investigating and prosecuting cyber attacks until such time as a new treaty system comes online. These other analogies including communications and cyber law, space law, and the law of the sea among others could function together to both define inappropriate state conduct related to IW, and to provide the basis for a functioning regime. For instance, a cyber attack could potentially activate the following treaty and legal provisions: (1) Article 35 of the International Telecommunications Union that deals with government