pendency of her case was neglect. The issue then is whether that neglect can be excused.
In discussing the standard for excusable neglect, the Supreme Court held that the
issue is “an equitable one,” and that a court should consider “all relevant circumstances
surrounding the party’s omission.” Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick
Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). The relevant factors to consider
include (1) the danger of prejudice to the non-moving party; (2) the length of the delay
and its potential impact on judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay, including
consideration of whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant; and (4)
whether the movant acted in good faith.8 Id.
Danger of Prejudice to the Non-Moving Party
The defendants insist that they “will be greatly prejudiced if [they are] forced to
continue to spend money defending a baseless action.” See Def.’s Memorandum of Law
in Support of its Response at 5. I disagree. First, as the defendants concede, neither side
has conducted any discovery in this case, even in the face of a court Order dated June 18,
2001. Second, whether the action is “baseless” remains to be seen.
7(...continued) relief provided for in clauses (b)(1) through (b)(5). Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988). Rule 60(b)(6) can be used to vacate judgments “whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice,” but it should only be used in “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 864. Extraordinary circumstances do not exist here which would justify such relief.
8 Although Pioneer was a bankruptcy case, the Third Circuit held that Pioneer’s four factor analysis of the excusable neglect standard applies in a Rule 60(b) context. See George Harms Constr. Co. v. Chao, 371 F.3d 156, 163 (3d Cir. 2004).