Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that reopening a case
does not create sufficient prejudice to the non-movant to refuse relief from judgment,
stating “[o]f course, it is always prejudicial for a party to have a case reopened after it has
been closed advantageously by an opponent’s default. But we do not think that is the
sense in which the term ‘prejudice’ is used in Pioneer.” Pratt v. Philbrook, 109 F.3d 18,
22 (1st Cir. 1997).
Thus, I find that the danger of prejudice to the defendants in reopening this case is
minimal, especially when compared with the prejudice to the plaintiff should her claims
Length of the Delay
I granted plaintiff’s counsel leave to withdraw on May 24, 2006. The defendants
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute on June 7, 2006, which I granted on June
9, 2006. On June 28, 2006, the plaintiff filed the instant motion to reopen her case.
Nineteen days passed between the date the case was dismissed and the date the motion to
reopen the case was filed. Once Thompson became aware of the dismissal of her case,
she contacted her attorneys and explained the reasons for not being in contact with them.
Further, there is no potential impact on judicial proceedings caused by such an
insignificant delay in requesting the reopening. Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of