X hits on this document

29 views

0 shares

0 downloads

0 comments

6 / 10

Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that reopening a case

does not create sufficient prejudice to the non-movant to refuse relief from judgment,

stating “[o]f course, it is always prejudicial for a party to have a case reopened after it has

been closed advantageously by an opponent’s default. But we do not think that is the

sense in which the term ‘prejudice’ is used in Pioneer.” Pratt v. Philbrook, 109 F.3d 18,

22 (1st Cir. 1997).

Thus, I find that the danger of prejudice to the defendants in reopening this case is

minimal, especially when compared with the prejudice to the plaintiff should her claims

be precluded.

2.

Length of the Delay

I granted plaintiff’s counsel leave to withdraw on May 24, 2006. The defendants

filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute on June 7, 2006, which I granted on June

9, 2006. On June 28, 2006, the plaintiff filed the instant motion to reopen her case.

Nineteen days passed between the date the case was dismissed and the date the motion to

reopen the case was filed. Once Thompson became aware of the dismissal of her case,

she contacted her attorneys and explained the reasons for not being in contact with them.

Further, there is no potential impact on judicial proceedings caused by such an

insignificant delay in requesting the reopening. Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of

Thompson.

6

Document info
Document views29
Page views29
Page last viewedThu Jan 19 17:21:33 UTC 2017
Pages10
Paragraphs178
Words2011

Comments