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When Delaware targets only are examined (Panel B), the TENDER coefficient for final

offers continues to be negative but is no longer statistically significant in Panel B. The weaker

results in Table 3B may be due at least in part to the smaller sample size. In unreported

regressions I introduce an interaction term DELAWARE*TENDER in the Table 3A models, to

test the hypothesis that the tender offer effect captured in Table 3A is driven solely by Delaware

targets. The coefficient for this interaction variable is not statistically significant, suggesting that

the tender offer effect is broader than just Delaware targets. One potential interpretation of these

findings is that differences in SC veto power drive at least some of the difference in outcomes

between

transactional

forms.

Another

potential

interpretation,

not

necessarily

mutually

exclusive, is that differences in judicial standards of review drive at least some of the difference

in outcomes, and that the Siliconix/Glassman contour has been implicitly accepted in other

states.

In contrast to these findings on Hypothesis H1, the results in Tables 3A and 3B do not

support Hypothesis H2. The MINREQ coefficient is not statistically significant in any of the

models, and has a negative sign (inconsistent with H2) in several regressions. In unreported

regressions I use non-linear transformations of MINREQ and calculate MINREQ as a fraction of

shares outstanding rather than the fraction of minority shares, and also do not obtain statistically

significant results.

Among controls, the coefficient for LNVAL is negative in all models, and becomes larger in

magnitude for final offers compared to initial offers. In Table 3B, LNVAL becomes statistically

significant at 95% confidence for final offers. The intuition behind these findings might be that

controllers are less likely to make concessions as the dollar value of those concessions increases.

26

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