had not been definitively established by the Court in any of its prior opinions. See Bell Aerospace Co., 94 S.Ct. at 1768; Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 89 S.Ct. at 1802. Thus, the “subsequent legislation” at issue in these cases did not involve a Congressional overturning of settled Supreme Court precedent. Each case involved a situation in which the Court examined a statute and established its definitive interpretation for the first time.
In Glidden, the Eighty-third and Eighty-fifth Congresses had passed legislation that disagreed with a line of Supreme Court cases that had held that earlier Congresses had not established the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals or the United States Court of Claims as Article III courts. Glidden, 82 S.Ct. at 1463. In reviewing the Eighty-third and Eighty-fifth Congresses’ legislation, the Supreme Court stated that, in judging for itself whether or not the precedent in question had been correctly decided, it was proper to give some weight to the later Congresses’ interpretation of the earlier Congresses’ intent in establishing the courts. Id. at 1468. Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court stated that it was not bound by the Eighty-third and the Eighty-fifth Congresses’ interpretation, because the case involved a constitutional question. Id. The presence of a constitutional question gave the Court the power to invalidate the later Congresses’ desired interpretation. Therefore, as in Bell Aerospace and Red Lion Broadcasting, the Court had yet to render a definitive interpretation of the statute at issue in Glidden when it decided to give some weight to the later Congresses’ interpretation.
Carmona’s case is different, because the Supreme Court established the definitive interpretation of the ADA’s definition of “disability” in Sutton and Williams. This interpretation was later partially overruled by the ADAAA,