X hits on this document





14 / 26

but until the ADAAA went into effect, all lower courts remained bound by the Supreme Court’s settled interpretation. The effective date of the ADAAA was January 1, 2009. This case was filed, tried, and decided before then. Therefore, in order for us to depart from the Supreme Court’s settled interpretation, we would need to find that Congress intended the ADAAA to apply retroactively. We have already declined to do that. See Agro Distribution, LLC, 555 F.3d at 469 n.8. Accordingly, we must apply the Supreme Court’s pre-ADAA definition of “disability.”

Carmona only claims to have established that he was an “individual with a disability” under Prong (A) of the ADA’s definition of “disability.” See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12102(2). Specifically, he asserts that he submitted sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that his psoriasis and his psoriatic arthritis substantially limited his major life activities of sleeping, walking, and standing. We do not address Carmona’s arguments that he presented sufficient evidence that he was substantially limited in the major life activities of sleeping and standing, because we find that he presented sufficient evidence that he was substantially limited in the major life activity of walking.

Carmona testified that his psoriatic arthritis made him unable to walk when it flared-up. He stated that, “when that happens I just stay immobile . . . wherever I am. Or if I do move, I crawl around . . . it’s quite painful.” He testified that these flare-ups could occur as often as twice in the same week. This testimony was corroborated by documents entered into evidence by both Carmona and Southwest that contained medical evaluations of Carmona’s condition that were made and signed by Carmona’s physician, Dr. Tom Roark (Roark). In these documents, Roark stated that Carmona needed to be granted intermittent FMLA leave, because he would be “incapacitated” three


Document info
Document views75
Page views75
Page last viewedTue Jan 17 07:38:38 UTC 2017