his pre-termination review, even though leniency had been granted to similarly-situated employees who were not disabled. Though, as stated, the issue is a close one, we ultimately conclude that a reasonable jury could have found Southwest’s proffered explanation for Carmona’s discharge was false and that the true reason was his disability.
E. Conclusion A reasonable jury could have concluded, based on the evidence in this case, that Carmona was an “individual with a disability” within the meaning of the ADA, that he was “qualified” for his position within the meaning of the ADA, and that he was terminated “because of” his disability. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12102, 12111, 12112 (2005). Therefore, we hold that the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law to Southwest. II. Reinstatement
Carmona argues that if the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law to Southwest, then it also erred in denying his motion for reinstatement. We review a district court’s determination of whether or not to grant reinstatement for abuse of discretion. Brunneman v. Terra Int’l, Inc., 975 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1992).
The ADA adopts the remedies set forth in Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2005) (“The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e–4, 2000e–5, 2000e–6, 2000e–8, and 2000e–9 of this title shall be the powers, remedies and procedures this subchapter provides to . . . any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of any provision of this chapter . . . .”). Title VII states in part that, “If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in . . . an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may . . . order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,