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ORDER:  8300.10    

APPENDIX:  3

BULLETIN TYPE:  Flight Standards Handbook Bulletin

For Airworthiness (HBAW)

BULLETIN NUMBER:  HBAW 05-07

BULLETIN TITLE:  The Enhanced Repair Station and Air Carrier Oversight System

EFFECTIVE DATE:  09-30-05

TRACKING NUMBER:NA

APPLICABILITY:  

M/M

ATA Code

14 CFR

PTRS

NA

NA

121,125,129,135,145

New and Revised activity codes

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1.  PURPOSE.  This bulletin contains the introduction to the Enhanced Repair Station and Air Carrier Oversight System.   The new risk-based oversight system will allow for continuous assessment of each certificated repair station, and outsource maintenance provider.  It describes the changes in the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Order 8300.10, Airworthiness Inspector’s Handbook, and the reasons for the changes.  It provides information regarding the new and revised Program Tracking and Reporting Subsystem (PTRS) activity codes, and for the new repair station and air carrier outsource maintenance program, that each operator and agency will be required to make part of their respective manual system.  Because the changes to the surveillance system are vast they are difficult to list them all.  It will be incumbent upon each and every aviation safety inspector (ASI) to familiarize themselves with each change.  This bulletin informs Flight Standards personnel involved in the certificate management of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) parts 121, 125, 129, 135, 145, and other interested personnel.

2. BACKGROUND. Development of the Enhanced Repair Stations and Air Carrier Outsource Maintenance Oversight System.  Flight Standards aircraft Maintenance Division, AFS-300, with the aid of a task force of field inspectors developed a safety systems approach that provides a logical structure for problem solving, and views the entire system as an integrated whole.  It should also be recognized that in such a complex and dynamic system all threats to safety cannot be avoided and or predicted, hence prevention should not be relied upon alone.  To achieve a high level of confidence, safety must be designed in the system and hazards eliminated

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