the domestic politics of mainland China, and the perceptual biases of Chinese elites can pose significant challenges for American security strategy in the region." How exactly could China's People Liberation Army (PLA) offset the U.S. nuclear and conventional force advantage? What are the perceptual biases of Chinese elites (especially the officer corps of the PLA)? How might those biases undermine a stable deterrence relationship between China and Taiwan and between China and the U.S.?
Module Week III (13 December 2004) (Third Term Week 3) Topic: Ethnic Civil Wars and Third Party Intervention Required Readings
Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, vol. 20, no. 4 (spring 1996), pp. 136-175.
Sarah Kenyon Lischer, "Collateral Damaage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict," I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , v o l . 2 8 , n o . 1 ( s u m m e r 2 0 0 3 ) , p p . 7 9 - 1 0 9 .
Timothy W. Crawford, "Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War: Why the Holbrooke Agreement Failed," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 116, no. 4 (winter 2001/02), pp. 499-525.
Daniel Byman and Taylor Seybolt, "Humanitarian Intervention and Communal Civil Wars," Security Studies, vol. 13, no. 1 (autumn 2003), pp. 33-78.
Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).
Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
How does the security dilemma exacerbate fears among different ethnic groups and increase the likelihood of violence? In light of the 1995 Dayton peace accords that ended the Bosnian civil war, are Chaim Kaufmann's arguments in favor of partition as the only long-term solution to ethnic civil wars still persuasive?
Sarah Kenyon Lischer argues that although humanitarian relief in ethnic civil wars may be neutral in intent, "the effects of humanitarian actions always have political, and sometimes military, repercussions." Drawing upon the cases of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the ensuing refugee crisis in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), how might international relief organizations have better used their resources to influence the actions of the various parties?
How does Timothy Crawford's conception of pivotal deterrence differ from other types of deterrence encounters between adversaries? In what ways did the Clinton administration's threats of force play into the hands of then-Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic and the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1998 and early 1999? Drawing upon the Kosovo case, what dangers might great powers face in seeking serve as third-party mediators in ethnic civil wars?