it restricts the "legitimate" possession of nuclear weapons to five states (the United States, Russia, China, France, and Great Britain)?
Taking a different perspective than Braun and Chyba, Ariel Levite seeks to explain why the "nightmare proliferation scenarios" of the 1960s, which foresaw the emergence of several dozen nuclear weapons states, failed to materialize. Instead of developing and maintaining nuclear arsenals and delivery systems, many states have instead engaged in nuclear reversal, nuclear restraints, and what Levite terms "nuclear hedging." Under what conditions are states more likely to engage in nuclear hedging?
What are the implications of nuclear hedging for deterrence, particularly between states with enduring rivalries? Is the concept of nuclear hedging an accurate description of the strategies pursued by North Korea and Iran in recent years?
Gregory Koblentz writes, "The offense-defense balance in biological warfare strongly favor the attacker because developing and using biological weapons to cause casualties is significantly easier and less expensive than developing and fielding defenses against them." Yet, to date, there have been few cases where states have actually used viral pathogens and bacteria in warfare. Given the relative ease of acquiring viral pathogens, what might explain this paradox? How does the secrecy regarding biological weapons programs weaken deterrence, impede civilian oversight, and complicate threat assessments?
Module Week V (10 January 2005) (Third Term Week 5) Topic: Military Transformation and Conventional Force Structure Required Readings Seyom Brown, Illusion of Control, pp. 78-104 and 142-178.
Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds, "Revolutionary Ambivalence: Understanding Officers' Attitudes toward Transformation," International Security, vol. 28, no. 2 (fall
, pp. 112-148.
W. Singer, "Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for International Security," International Security, vol. 26, no. 3 (winter 2001/2002), pp. 186-220.
Eliot A. Cohen, "Change and Transformation in Military Affairs," Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 27, no. 3 (September 2004), pp. 395-407.
John Stone, "Politics, Technology, and the Revolution in Military Affairs," Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 27, no. 3 (September 2004), pp. 408-427.
Colin S. Gray, Transformation and Strategic Surprise, Monograph # 602 (Carlise Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005) Available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB602.pdf
Cindy Williams, ed., Holding the Line: U.S. Defense Alternatives for the Early 21st Century (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).
P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).
Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).