Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002).
T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds., The Balance-of-Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
What do international relations scholars working in the realist tradition, such as William Wohlforth and Kenneth Waltz, mean by the term unipolarity? How does unipolarity differ from bipolarity and multipolarity? Does the conception of unipolarity found in academic literature differ from the conception found in the national security policy community?
Wohlforth argues "No other major power is in a position to follow that depends for its success on prevailing against the United States in a war or an extended rivalry…None is likely to take any step that might invite the focused enmity of the United States." If the costs of balancing against the United States are prohibitive, then what other options are available to second tier great powers (Russia, China, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to influence Washington's behavior?
How does Seyom Brown define polyarchy? If the international system is undergoing a transformation from unipolarity to polyarchy, what might be the implications for U.S. national security?
Session 2: Theory and Practice of Coercion Required Readings
Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 1-85.
Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).
Robert J. Art and Patrick Cronin, eds., The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003).
Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in Modern War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
Robert A. Pape, Barry D. Watts, and John A. Warden, III, "Theory and Evidence in Security Studies: Debating Robert A. Pape's Bombing to Win," Security Studies, vol. 7, no. 2 (winter 1997/98), pp. 91-214.
Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). Discussion Questions
What is "coercion"? Is it useful to think of coercion and deterrence as separate phenomena or strategies? What are the main assumptions and propositions of deterrence theory?
Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman argue, "Classifying a case as a success or failure depends on what behavior an observer thinks the coercer seeks, leading to confusion when different analyses of the same event are compared." Instead of thinking of coercion in binary terms (success or failure), it more useful to think of it in probabilistic terms. The dependent variable (DV) in analyzing coercive threats should be the marginal change in