Module Week II (6 December 2005) (Third Term Week 2) Topic: The Rise of China and the Future of Great Power Politics in East Asia Required Readings
Michael Mastanduno, "Incomplete Hegemony and the Security Order in the Asia-Pacific," in Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled, pp. 181-212.
Robert S. Ross, "Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.- China Relations," International Security, vol. 27, no. 2 (fall 2002), pp. 48-85.
Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy, International Security, vol. 25, no. 4 (spring 2001), pp. 5-40.
David J. Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," International Security, vol. 29, no. 3 (winter 2004/05), pp. 64-99.
Michael A. Glosny, "Strangulation from the Sea: A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan," International Security, vol. 28, no. 4 (spring 2004), pp. 125–160
Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: China’s Maturing Submarine Force,” International Security, vol. 28, No. 4 (spring 2004), pp. 161–196.
Michael O'Hanlon, Lyle Goldstein, and William Murray, "Correspondence: Damn the Torpedoes: Debating Possible U.S. Navy Losses in a Taiwan Scenario," International Security, vol. 29, no. 4 (fall 2004), pp. 202-206.
Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).
Harold Brown, Joseph W. Prueher, and Adam Segal, Chinese Military Power: An Independent Task Force Report (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004). Available online at http:///www.cfr.org
Michael Mastanduno argues that the United States has succeeded in establishing a "partial hegemonic order" in East Asia. American power in the region has served to restrain great power rivals (Japan, China, Russia, and India) from engaging in major conflict and help to reassure smaller states (e.g., South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia) that their security and interests will be protected. How does Mastanduno define hegemony? In what ways is this existing hegemonic order in East Asia different from a possible concert of great powers or a balance-of-power regional order?
Robert Ross argues that absent a formal declaration of independence by Taiwan, the United States can be very confident that it can continue to deter the use of force by China against the island. He writes, "The United States possesses the capabilities—including a robust war-fighting force and 'escalation dominance'—that even the most cautious analysts argued were necessary for deterring Soviet aggression." How are the current problems of U.S. extended deterrence in the Taiwan Strait similar to the problems of U.S. extended deterrence of a Soviet attack on Western Europe during the Cold War? Under what conditions might Chinese leaders become undeterrable?
Writing before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent improvement in U.S.-China relations, Thomas Christensen offers a less sanguine assessment of the long-term prospects of peace in East Asia. Contrary to Ross, Christensen argues that "certain Chinese military capabilities combined with the political geography of East Asia,