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xiv

International Energy Markets

Fig. 6–9 Marginal Cost for a Two-Country OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .152 Fig. 6–10 OPEC’s Optimal Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154 Fig. 6–11 Allocating Optimal Production Across OPEC Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154 Fig. 6–12 Multiplant Monopoly Numerical Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .155 Fig. 6-13 Developing Demand for OPEC’s Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .156 Fig. 6–14 Dominant Firm Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .157 Fig. 6–15 Dominant Firm Numerical Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .158 Fig. 6–16 Marginal Social Efficiency of Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163 Fig. 6–17 Target Revenues and Output for Low-

and High-Absorber Counties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .164 Fig. 6–18 Target Revenues and Price Increase for Low-

and High-Absorber Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165 Fig. 7–1 Natural Gas World Consumption and Production, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .171 Fig. 7–2 Historical Natural Gas Consumption in the U.S. by Major Sector . . . . . . .175 Fig. 7–3 Historical Natural Gas Prices, 1920–2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .188 Fig. 7–4 Prominent U.S. Gas Market Hubs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .189 Fig. 7–5 Natural Gas Prices by Sector, 1984–2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .191 Fig. 7–6 U.S. Gas from Storage and Gas Spot Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .193 Fig. 8–1 Supply and Demand in a Market with Negative Externalities . . . . . . . . . . .203 Fig. 8–2 Costs and Benefits of Water Pollution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .204 Fig. 8–3 Varying Marginal Costs by Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .207 Fig. 8–4 Marginal Abatement Costs for Two Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .208 Fig. 8–5 SO2 Emissions Rate Reductions for 441 Generating Units,

1985 and 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .210 Fig. 9–1 Coastal and Inland Demand for CO2 Abatement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .214 Fig. 9–2 Total Social Benefits and Social Optimum for CO2 Abatement . . . . . . . . .215 Fig. 9–3 Social Losses for Private Market Production of Public Goods . . . . . . . . . . .216 Fig. 9–4 Social Optimum for a Public Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .216 Fig. 9–5 Permits Issued Under Different Abatement Cost Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . .229 Fig. 10–1 Financing Energy Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .232 Fig. 10–2 Monopsony Purchase of Inputs for Competitive Constant Output Market

and Constant Marginal Product up to Generating Capacity . . . . . . . . . . .240 Fig. 10–3 Monopsony Purchases of LNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .241 Fig. 10–4 Perfectly Price-Discriminating Monopsonist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .242 Fig. 10–5 OLEC as Monopoly Seller of LNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .243 Fig. 10–6 Bilateral Monopoly in the Asia-Pacific LNG Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .244 Fig. 11–1 Reaction Function for a Duopoly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .270 Fig. 11–2 Marginal Cost Curves for Producer 1 and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .273 Fig. 11–3 Market Supply and Demand in a Competitive Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .273 Fig. 11–4 Two Gas Producers Acting as a Monopolist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .274 Fig. 11–5 Limit Pricing Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .276 Fig. 12–1 R/P Ratios for the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .283 Fig. 12–2 Demand in the Current Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .287 Fig. 12–3 Demand for Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .287 Fig. 12–4 Optimal Allocation of a Resource in a Two-Period Model . . . . . . . . . . . .288 Fig. 12–5 Consumer Surplus in a Two-Period Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .290 Fig. 12–6 Dynamic Competitive Solution Maximizes NPV of Social Welfare . . . . .291

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