that, at most, State Farm asserts the existence of an incentive structure through which
unidentified persons received some benefit for furthering counterclaim-defendants’ insurance
fraud scheme. However, State Farm does not plead facts to describe the nature or type of
incentives used or to whom such incentives were given. Moreover, in Count II, State Farm does
not even identify with sufficient clarity which of the counterclaim-defendants had a role in
paying the proscribed kickbacks. Instead, State Farm alleges that “[e]ach Counterclaim
Defendant, or in the alternative many” of the counterclaim-defendants participated in paying
kickbacks. Overall, State Farm leaves too many holes for counterclaim-defendants to fill. Such
imprecise pleading does not satisfy the requisite pleading standard, and I will grant counterclaim-
defendants’ motion to dismiss Count II to the extent that State Farm invokes § 4117(b).
In summary, I find that State Farm has sufficiently pleaded claims under only § 4117(a)
and only as to those reimbursement requests itemized in paragraphs nineteen or twenty-five or
both. I will deny counterclaim-defendants’ motion to dismiss this portion of Count II, but will
grant their motion with respect to the balance of Count II.
Count III: Unjust Enrichment
Counterclaim-defendants argue that State Farm’s unjust enrichment claim (Count III) is
premised on mistake of fact, and therefore is subject to Rule 9(b). Again, State Farm does not
contest the applicability of Rule 9(b); rather, State Farm asserts that it has pleaded facts sufficient
to survive a Rule 9(b) challenge.
Rule 9(b) applies to allegations of fraud and allegations of mistake. See Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (reminding that Rule 9(b) applies in “all averments of
fraud or mistake”). In Count III, State Farm avers that it reimbursed counterclaim-defendants