These theories have had a substantial impact on technical aspects of cinematography
through the use of particular camera angles and positions, but their contribution to the
theory sought for VR is more problematic. In Cinema, the camera is under authorial
control, so that the ideal observer it represents is in some sense the narrator. In VR,
the camera is identified with the user, and removing their control over it directly
contradicts the freedom to move and look that is one of the major defining
characteristics of the medium. In this sense, VR moves beyond mimesis – ‘showing’ –
with its implication of direction, to ‘experiencing’. Thus though both Cinema and VR
share a synthetic visual aspect there are fundamental differences between them which
make the narrative theory of film much less useful than one might have assumed.
Given that Aristotle gives little theoretical weight to the role of emotion in narrative
(as distinct from its emotional impact upon the spectator), it is not surprising that the
subsequent theories already mentioned do not pay any particular attention to emotion
and its values. It is now believed that emotions play an important role in human
cognition and are a major factor in the establishment of believability . A narrative
theory for VR must encompass the emotional contribution to believability, which
contributes towards providing the user with a unique immersive experience.
Eisenstein’s expressionist approach  was to regard narration as making manifest
some essential emotional quality of the story . With the aim of a satisfactory user
experience in mind, this expressionist narrative conception might be included in the
consideration of a narrative model proper to VR.