required to establish a duty under Restatement § 339.7
Moreover, Choate adduced no evidence that the accident occurred because of the
lack of a public crossing nearby. To the contrary, Choate admitted that he hopped the
train to impress his girlfriend. Tr. 1743. He could have engaged in this daredevilry
anywhere. Yet Dr. Berg admitted that he limited his analysis to people “traversing” the
tracks “somewhere between Ridgeland and Central.” Tr. 1289 (emphasis added). That
kind of testimony is insufficient to support liability under Section 339. As one court has
explained in analogous circumstances:
[T]he burden on this defendant to protect against a particular danger must be considered on a system-wide level, and not just with regard to a particular location or a particular city or state. . . . It is, of course, obvious that if there were imposed upon the defendant the requirement of fencing the place where this accident occurred, it would likewise be subject to the duty of fencing the innumerable places along its many miles of tracks frequented by trespassing children.
Edwards v. Consol. Rail Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1087, 1111 (D.D.C. 1983) (internal
quotation marks omitted and emphasis added). In other words, the particular area
between Ridgeland and Central Avenues that Dr. Berg asserts should have been
improved was not exceptionally dangerous to trespassing children who choose to jump on
moving trains as compared with any other stretch of track. Thus, imposition of a duty on
defendants under these circumstances would effectively require them to upgrade all of
7 See DOBBS, supra, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 59, at 411; Holland, 431 A.2d at 603 n.11 (“railroads are generally under no duty to erect fences or maintain other safeguards” against child trespassers being injured by moving trains); Frazee v. St. Louis- San Francisco Ry., 549 P.2d 561, 666 (Kan. 1976) (“For this court to impose that kind of a duty on the railroad company would place an unreasonable burden upon the railroad . . . Nothing short of the most pervasive and expensive security measure could ever prevent a person from running . . . to the side of a railroad car and jumping on.”); Kline v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 276 A.2d 890, 893 (Conn. 1970) (“the impracticable and burdensome task” of “prevent[ing] children from attempting to board” moving trains meant that the jury would not “have been justified in finding any breach of duty”).