their rights-of-way; an improvement at any one location “could not adequately have
prevented children from boarding the train at some other point.” Scibelli v. Penn. R.R.,
108 A.2d 348, 352 (Pa. 1954) (emphasis added); Ill. State Trust, 440 F.2d at 501; accord
Lamkin v. Towner, 138 Ill. 2d 510, 524-25 (1990) (“limit[ing] application of the
[purported] duty” based on “location” would be “illogical”); Butler, 909 A.2d at 114 (“To
require all [similarly located] streams . . . to be fenced . . . would in the ordinary settled
community practically include all streams . . .”); Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n v.
Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 870 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
Dr. Berg’s conclusion that the Ridgeland/Austin/Central improvements would
have been an effective remedy was impermissibly “based on assumptions . . .
contradicted by the evidence” (Royal Elm Nursing, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 79)—i.e., Choate’s
admission that when the accident occurred, he “certainly wasn’t thinking about crossing
the tracks,” but rather was “trying to jump on the train to impress” his girlfriend. Tr.
1743. As a result, Dr. Berg’s proposed improvements could not possibly have
“remed[ied] the . . . [allegedly] dangerous condition” that resulted in the accident. Mt.
Zion, 169 Ill. 2d at 117. Because Choate “failed to offer any competent expert testimony
to establish” this required element of his claim, defendants are entitled to judgment.
Garley v. Columbia LaGrange Mem’l Hosp., 351 Ill. App. 3d 398, 410 (1st Dist. 2004).
Second, even if it were supposed that fencing and overpass construction could in
principle eliminate the danger of moving trains, there was no factual support for a finding
that Dr. Berg’s proposed improvements could feasibly be implemented, much less that
their “expense and inconvenience” would be slight. Mt. Zion, 169 Ill. 2d at 117. Dr. Berg
testified that a crossing at Austin should be built “in conjunction with fencing” on both