trespassing child] off the right of way”).
In sum, Dr. Berg’s opinion that his proposal would be effective and could feasibly
be implemented “ha[d] no basis in fact” and was based on “mere conjecture.” Damron,
276 Ill. App. 3d at 907, 909; see also Edwards, 567 F. Supp. at 1110. “When there is no
factual support . . . [the expert’s] conclusions alone do not create a question of fact.”
Gyllin v. Coll. Craft Enters., Ltd., 260 Ill. App. 3d 707, 715 (2d Dist. 1994). Given
Choate’s failure to offer any competent evidence on this essential point, defendants are
entitled to judgment.
The Trial Court’s One-sided And Patently Erroneous Evidentiary Decisions Necessitate A New Trial.
At the very least, the trial court’s erroneous evidentiary rulings—both
individually and especially when considered together—amounted to prejudicial error
requiring a new trial. See Christou v. Arlington Park-Washington Park Race Tracks
Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d 257, 260 (1st Dist. 1982).
Because Choate Was Bound By His Judicial Admissions That He Appreciated The Dangerousness Of Moving Trains, The Trial Court Erred In Barring Defendants From Introducing Those Admissions And In Allowing Him To Contradict Them At Trial.
At his deposition, Choate admitted that he “[r]ecognized that on the day of the
accident[,] the train tracks were dangerous . . . [a]nd that the train that [he was] grabbing
onto was dangerous.” D. Choate Dep. 127-28 (A29). He admitted that he tried to jump
onto the moving train to show off for Van Witzenburg, and for no other reason. Id. at 78,
194, 196, 205-06 (A26, 31-32). In the trial court’s view, these statements were
conclusions, not “unequivocal factual admissions.” Tr. 221. The trial court’s holding that
these statements were not judicial admissions was erroneous, as was its holding that they
could be “equivocated or challenged by” Choate. Tr. 116, 263.