must have known that their “education and enforcement [efforts] were not working” (Tr.
692); and that they had to do more to “provide a reasonable level of safety” to trespassing
children (Tr. 1301). This evidence was, as a matter of law, irrelevant to any fact issue
properly before the jury. As we explain above (at pp. 28-29), it is a commonplace that
some children will expose themselves to dangers, even when they realize the risks of
doing so. Evidence that other children hopped trains neither undermines the objective
obviousness of the danger of moving trains nor detracts from Choate’s admission that he
subjectively understood that danger. The courts of this state already have rejected the
notion that “one child’s prior failure to avoid an obvious risk would make a later child’s
failure to avoid the same obvious risk foreseeable.” Hootman, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 651.
Furthermore, that evidence did not bear on the feasibility of the remedial measures that
Choate argues defendants should have implemented. Defendants made “persistent efforts
to keep youthful trespassers away” and “cannot be called upon to insure” their success,
even if defendants “had reason to know that they were being ignored.” Howard v. Atl.
Coast Line R.R., 231 F.2d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 1956).
The Trial Court Erred In Allowing Dr. Berg To Testify About Adolescent Behavior And Law Enforcement, Two Issues About Which He Had No Expertise.
Expert testimony is admissible only if the “proffered expert is qualified by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” and “the expert has specialized
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining
a fact at issue.” Todd W., 394 Ill. App. 3d at 800 (internal quotation marks omitted). Dr.
Berg, a civil engineer, was not qualified to testify regarding child psychology (e.g., the
“maturity” of young people and why trains posed a danger to children, Tr. 1243) or the
effectiveness of defendants’ policing efforts (e.g., Tr. 1377-1378, 1392). Tellingly, the