Statements that after 1991 the Iraqi regime was determined to maintain the intellectual capital necessary for reconstruction of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programmes once sanctions were significantly eroded or lifted.
For the reasons given above, even now it is premature to reach conclusions about Iraq’s prohibited weapons. But from the evidence which has been found and de-briefing of Iraqi personnel it appears that prior to the war the Iraqi regime:
Had the strategic intention of resuming the pursuit of prohibited weapons programmes, including if possible its nuclear weapons programme, when United Nations inspection regimes were relaxed and sanctions were eroded or lifted.
In support of that goal, was carrying out illicit research and development, and procurement, activities.
Was developing ballistic missiles with a range longer than permitted under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Did not, however, have significant - if any - stocks of chemical or biological weapons in a state fit for deployment, or developed plans for using them.
5.9 VALIDATION OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
During the course of our Review, SIS provided a series of commentaries on the results of their post-war validation of the main sources of human intelligence in the run-up to the war on Iraqi chemical and biological weapons, their use and their concealment. The good faith and reliability of some of those sources have been verified. But doubts - and in some cases serious doubts - have emerged about the reliability of intelligence from three sources whose intelligence helped to underpin JIC assessments and the Government’s dossier of September 2002. We set out below the position at the time of conclusion of our Review.
Before doing so, however, we believe that it would be helpful to set in context the relative influence of each of the main SIS sources whose reporting underpinned JIC assessments. We cannot here set out in full the analysis we made; doing so would present an unacceptable risk to the continued security of sources and to the confidence of other current and potential SIS sources that their secrets will remain safe with SIS. But we can provide a description both of the subjects on which SIS’s main sources reported and of the volume of their reporting. We are also able to include our conclusions on their validation.
SIS’s main sources reported on the production and possession of stocks of chemical and biological agents; on the weaponisation and deployment of those agents; on the use by