Furthermore, we conclude that, if intelligence is to be used more widely by governments in public debate in future, those doing so must be careful to explain its uses and limitations. It will be essential, too, that clearer and more effective dividing lines between assessment and advocacy are established when doing so.
In reaching these conclusions, we realise that our conclusions may provoke calls for the current Chairman of the JIC, Mr Scarlett, to withdraw from his
wishes to seek the JIC’s credibility and authority, could publish a document with intelligence material and the JIC’s endorsement of it shown separately. Or the JIC could prepare and publish itself a self- standing assessment, incorporating all of its normal caveats and warnings, leaving it to others to place that document within a broader
appointment as the next Chief of SIS.
policy context. making a policy
This may make such documents less persuasive in case; but that is the price of using a JIC assessment. Our
Whichever route is chosen, JIC clearance any similar document will be essential.
We greatly hope that he will not abilities and his record. Once
on ownership of it with the excellent motive of ensuring that consistent with JIC judgements. We have said above that it was a
everything it said was mistaken judgement for
dossier to Chairman
be so of the
closely associated with the JIC but it was a JIC should not bear personal responsibility.
Intelligence and the legality of the use of military force
As described in Section 5.7, the part played by intelligence in determining the legality of the use of force was limited. The criterion which the Attorney General advised the Government to apply was the degree of Iraq’s compliance and co-operation with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441.
The Government received on 18 December the JIC’s initial assessment on the quality of Iraq’s declaration of 7 December, called for under Resolution 1441, on the status of its prohibited programmes. The Government also received in the period between September 2002 and March 2003 a significant stream of intelligence reports about attempts by the Iraqi regime at concealment, as well as information about the results of UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections inside Iraq, captured in the reports provided to the United Nations Security Council.