X hits on this document

PDF document

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 14th July 2004 - page 156 / 216

753 views

0 shares

0 downloads

0 comments

156 / 216

142

CO-ORDINATION OF COUNTER-PROLIFERATION ACTIVITY

  • 585.

    It is clear that, in the continuing struggle against proliferation, it will be essential to continue to bring to bear all sources of intelligence in a co-ordinated way. We have noted in our general Conclusions on Chapter 2 that success in the cases we studied came through close collaboration between all involved to piece together the intelligence picture, with teams able to have shared access to all available intelligence. We welcome the arrangements for bringing together all sources of expertise on terrorism into the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre. We have considered whether to recommend a similar organisation to deal with counter-proliferation. The difference between counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation is that a large part of the former is a problem of analysing and dealing with day-to-day threats while the latter is longer-term. We do not therefore consider that it would be justified or helpful to bring experts out of their parent organisations and to co-locate them. Moreover, we are impressed with the growing co- operation between departments and agencies and the exploitation of technical expertise through cross-postings and secondments. However, we consider that it would be helpful through day-to-day processes and the use of new information systems to create a ‘virtual’ network bringing together the various sources of expertise in Government on proliferation and on activity to tackle it, who would be known to each other and could consult each other easily.

    • 7.2

      INTELLIGENCE MACHINERY

THE DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE STAFF

  • 586.

    Much of the Government’s expertise on technical issues relating to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles rests in the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). This expertise is used to produce all-source analysis which underpins the intelligence community’s understanding on weapons programmes. Unlike the agencies, the DIS is not free-standing and, because its focus must be concentrated on the department it serves, it has in the past perhaps been seen as rather separate from the rest of the intelligence community, although it would be wrong to exaggerate this. We have considered whether to recommend that the DIS should be brought out of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and become a separate agency with a similar relationship to the MOD as the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) have to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

  • 587.

    Because the DIS is so crucial to the MOD in everything from strategic planning through equipment acquisition to the conduct of military operations, we do not believe that this would be helpful. But we consider that further steps are needed to integrate the relevant work of the DIS more closely with the rest of the intelligence community. We welcome the arrangements now being made to give the Joint Intelligence Committee more leverage through the Intelligence Requirements process to ensure that the DIS serves wider national priorities as well as it does defence priorities and has the resources which the rest of the intelligence community needs to support its activities. If that involved increasing the Secret Intelligence Account by a sum to be at

Document info
Document views753
Page views753
Page last viewedSat Dec 03 09:41:21 UTC 2016
Pages216
Paragraphs4262
Words90706

Comments