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Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 14th July 2004 - page 163 / 216

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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

This summary follows the order of the Chapters of our Report. It comprises the passages we have highlighted in each Section and is intended to convey the gist of our Conclusions. However, we emphasise the importance of reading the Sections of the Report in full since the picture of the sources, assessment and use of intelligence is necessarily complicated and our Conclusions need to be read in context in order to be fully understood.

CHAPTER 2 – COUNTRIES OF CONCERN OTHER THAN IRAQ AND GLOBAL TRADE

1.

All four of the case studies we discuss (AQ Khan, Libya, Iran, North Korea) were to a greater or lesser extent success stories. To a degree, that was inevitable – we chose those cases where intelligence about nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile programmes and proliferation activities can be discussed precisely because it has contributed to disclosure of those activities. But that should not detract from what has clearly been an impressive performance by the intelligence community and policy-makers in each case, and overall. (Paragraph 107)

2.

A number of common threads have become clear from our examination of each case. The first and most obvious is the powerful effect of exploiting the linkages where they exist between suppliers (AQ Khan; North Korea) and buyers (Iran; Libya; others) for counter- proliferation activity. It is in the nature of proliferation that what can be discovered about a supplier leads to information about the customer, and vice versa. The second thread flows from this – the powerful multiplier effect of effective international (in many cases, multinational) collaboration. Third, this is painstaking work, involving the piecing together over extended timescales of often fragmentary information. There are the surprises and ‘lucky breaks’. But they often come from the foundation of knowledge developed over several years. It requires close collaboration between all involved, in agencies and departments, to build the jigsaw, with teams able to have access to available intelligence and to make the most of each clue. It also depends on continuity of shared purpose amongst collectors and analysts, and between the intelligence and policy communities, in gathering, assessing and using intelligence in tackling proliferation and nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programmes which are destabilising in security terms. (Paragraphs 108/109)

CHAPTER 3 – TERRORISM

3.

All of the UK intelligence agencies are developing new techniques, and we have seen clear evidence that they are co-operating at all levels. (Paragraph 133)

4.

JTAC has now been operating for over a year and has proved a success. (Paragraph 134)

5.

International counter-terrorism collaboration has also been significantly enhanced in the past six or seven years. Though we understand that other countries have not yet achieved

CHAPTER 8

149

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