X hits on this document

PDF document

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 14th July 2004 - page 171 / 216

990 views

0 shares

0 downloads

0 comments

171 / 216

reference in the classified assessment was repeated in the dossier later led to suspicions that it had been included because of its eye-catching character. (Paragraph 511)

MOBILE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS LABORATORIES

47.

We consider that it was reasonable for the JIC to include in its assessments of March and September 2002 a reference to intelligence reports on Iraq’s seeking mobile biological agent production facilities. But it has emerged that the intelligence from the source, if it had been correctly reported, would not have been consistent with a judgement that Iraq had, on the basis of recent production, stocks of biological agent. If SIS had had direct access to the source from 2000 onwards, and hence correct intelligence reporting, the main evidence for JIC judgements on Iraq’s stocks of recently-produced biological agent, as opposed to a break-out capacity, would not have existed. (Paragraph 530)

ALUMINIUM TUBES

48.

The evidence we received on aluminium tubes was overwhelmingly that they were intended for rockets rather than a centrifuge. We found this convincing. Despite this, we conclude that the JIC was right to consider carefully the possibility that the tubes were evidence of a resumed nuclear programme, and that it properly reflected the doubts about the use of the tubes in the caution of its assessments. But in transferring its judgements to the dossier, the JIC omitted the important information about the need for substantial re-engineering of the aluminium tubes to make them suitable for use as gas centrifuge rotors. This omission had the effect of materially strengthening the impression that they may have been intended for a gas centrifuge and hence for a nuclear programme. (Paragraph 545)

PLAGUE AND DUSTY MUSTARD

49.

Plague and ‘dusty mustard’ were just two of the many biological and chemical threats on which the intelligence community had to keep watch in the period before the first Gulf war, and subsequently. (Paragraph 562)

50.

The intelligence on their availability to Iraq in 1990 and 1991 rested on a small number of reports and the evidence derived from examination of a munition. There were grounds for scepticism both about the reports’ sources and their quality. Nevertheless, we conclude that the Government was right in 1990 and 1991 to act on a precautionary basis. (Paragraph 563)

51.

We find it harder to understand the treatment of the intelligence in the ensuing period. ‘Dusty mustard’ disappears from JIC assessments from 1993 onwards. By contrast, although little new intelligence was received, and most of that was historical or unconvincing, plague continued to be mentioned in JIC assessments up to March 2003. Those fluctuated in the certainty of judgements about Iraqi possession of plague between “possibly” and “probably”. (Paragraph 564)

52.

We conclude that, in the case of plague, JIC assessments reflected historic evidence, and intelligence of dubious reliability, reinforced by suspicion of Iraq, rather than up-to-date evidence. (Paragraph 565)

157

Document info
Document views990
Page views990
Page last viewedTue Jan 17 21:57:05 UTC 2017
Pages216
Paragraphs4262
Words90706

Comments