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Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 14th July 2004 - page 177 / 216





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24 September 2002

24 September 2002

9 September 2002

21 August 2002

15 March 2002

FOREWORD TO THE GOVERNMENT DOSSIER (signed by the Prime Minister)

The document published today is based, in large part, on the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The JIC is at the heart of the British intelligence machinery. It is chaired by the Cabinet Office and made up of the heads of the UK's three Intelligence and Security Agencies, the Chief of Defence Intelligence, and senior officials from key government departments. For over 60 years the JIC has provided regular assessments to successive Prime Ministers and senior colleagues on a wide range of foreign policy and international security issues.

Its work, like the material it analyses, is largely secret. It is unprecedented for the Government to publish this kind of document. But in light of the debate about Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), I wanted to share with the British public the reasons why I believe this issue to be a current and serious threat to the UK national interest.

In recent months, I have been increasingly alarmed by the evidence from inside Iraq that despite sanctions, despite the damage done to his capability in the past, despite the UN Security Council Resolutions expressly outlawing it, and despite his denials, Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop WMD, and with them the ability to inflict real damage upon the region, and the stability of the world.

Gathering intelligence inside Iraq is


Executive Summary 1. Under Saddam Hussein Iraq developed chemical and biological weapons, acquired missiles allowing it to attack neighbouring countries with these weapons and persistently tried to develop a nuclear bomb. Saddam has used chemical weapons, both against Iran and against his own people. Following the Gulf War, Iraq had to admit to all this. And in the ceasefire of 1991 Saddam agreed unconditionally to give up his weapons of mass destruction.

2. Much information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is already in the public domain from UN reports and from Iraqi defectors. This points clearly to Iraq's continuing possession, after 1991, of chemical and biological agents and weapons produced before the Gulf War. It shows that Iraq has refurbished sites formerly associated with the production of chemical and biological agents. And it indicates that Iraq remains able to manufacture these agents, and to use bombs, shells, artillery rockets and ballistic missiles to deliver them.

3. An independent and well-researched overview of this public evidence was provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on 9 September. The IISS report also suggested that Iraq could assemble nuclear weapons within months of obtaining fissile material from foreign sources.

4. As well as the public evidence, however, significant additional information is available to the Government from secret intelligence sources, described in more detail in this paper. This intelligence cannot tell us about everything. However, it provides a fuller picture of Iraqi plans and capabilities. It shows that Saddam Hussein attaches great importance to possessing weapons of mass destruction which he regards as the basis for Iraq's regional power. It shows that he does not regard them only as weapons of last resort. He is ready to use them, including against his own population, and is determined to retain them, in breach of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR).

5. Intelligence also shows that Iraq is preparing plans to conceal evidence of these weapons, including incriminating documents, from renewed inspections. And it confirms that despite sanctions and the policy of containment, Saddam has continued to make progress with his illicit weapons programmes.

6. As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has:

Continued to produce chemical and biological agents;


JIC(02)202: IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS – POSSIBLE SCENARIOS (9 September 2002) (substantial extracts)

Key Judgements

Iraq has a chemical and biological weapons capability and Saddam is prepared to use it. . Faced with the likelihood



of military defeat and being removed from power, Saddam is unlikely to be deterred from using chemical and biological weapons by any diplomatic or military means. III. The use of chemical and biological weapons prior to any military attack would boost support for US-led action and is unlikely. IV. Saddam is prepared to order missile strikes against Israel, with chemical or biological warheads, in order to widen the war once hostilities begin. V. Saddam could order the use of CBW weapons in order to deny space and territory to Coalition forces, or to cause casualties, slow any advance, and sap US morale. VI. If not previously employed, Saddam will order the indiscriminate use of whatever CBW weapons remain available late in a ground campaign

JIC(02)181: IRAQ: SADDAM'S DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY OPTIONS (21 August 2002) (relevant extracts)


Key Judgements Early on in any conflict Saddam would order missile attacks on Israel, coalition forces and regional States providing the US with bases.

VI. Saddam would order the use of CBW against coalition forces at some point, probably after a coalition attack had begun. Once Saddam was convinced that his f a te was sealed, he would order the unrestrained use of CBW against coalition forces, supporting regional states and Israel.

... Secondary goals will be to preserve and enhance his WMD capability.

… As we have

JIC(02)059: THE STATUS OF IRAQI WMD PROGRAMMES (15 March 2002) (substantial extracts)


Key Judgements Iraq retains up to 20 Al Hussein ballistic missiles, produced prior to the Gulf War, with a range of 650km and capable of hitting Israel. The location and condition of these is unknown, but there is sufficient engineering expertise to make them operational.

Iraq has begun development of medium range ballistic missiles over 1000km that could target countries throughout the Middle East and Gulf Region, but will not be able to produce such a missile before 2007 provided sanctions remain effective.


III. Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. But it will not be able to indigenously produce a nuclear weapon while sanctions remain in place, unless suitable fissile material is purchased from abroad.


IV. Iraq may retain some stocks of chemical agents. Following a decision to do so, Iraq could produce: significant quantities of mustard within weeks; significant quantities of sarin and VX within months, and in the case of VX may have already done so.


Iraq currently has available, either from pre Gulf War stocks or more recent production, a number of biological agents. Iraq could



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