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Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 14th July 2004 - page 21 / 216

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CHAPTER 1

THE NATURE AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE

“Much of the intelligence that we receive in war is contradictory, even more of it is plain wrong, and most of it is fairly dubious. What one can require of an officer, under these circumstances, is a certain degree of discrimination, which can only be gained from knowledge of men and affairs and from good judgement. The law of probability must be his guide.” [Clausewitz, On War, Vol I, Bk I, Ch VI]

1.1 INTRODUCTION

20.

In view of the subject matter of our Review, and of what we have found in the course of it, we think that it may be helpful to the general reader to describe the nature of intelligence; the successive processes of validation, analysis and assessment which are necessary for using it properly; its limitations; and the risks which nevertheless remain.

21.

Governmental decisions and actions, at home and abroad, are based on many types of information. Most is openly available or compiled, much is published, and some is

consciously

provided

by

individuals,

organisations

or

other

governments

in

confidence. A great deal of such information may be accurate, or accurate enough in its own terms. But equally much is at best uninformed, while some is positively intended to mislead. To supplement their knowledge in areas of concern where information is for one reason or another inadequate, governments turn to secret sources. Information acquired against the wishes and (generally) without the knowledge of its originators or possessors is processed by collation with other material, validation, analysis and assessment and finally disseminated as ‘intelligence’. To emphasise the point, the term ‘secret intelligence’ is often used (as, for instance, enshrined in the title of the Secret Intelligence Service), but in this Review we shall use the simple word ‘intelligence’.

22.

The protective security barriers which intelligence collectors have to penetrate are usually formidable, and particularly so in the case of programmes which are the subject of this Review. Nuclear, biological and chemical programmes are amongst the ultimate state secrets, controlled by layers of security protection going beyond those applied to conventional weapons. Those of the greatest concern to governments are usually embedded within a strong apparatus of state control. Few of the many people who are necessarily involved in such programmes have a view of more than their own immediate

working

environment,

and

very few

have

comprehensive

knowledge

of the

arrangements for the control, storage, release and use of the resulting weapons. At every stage from initial research and development to deployed forces, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery systems are treated as being of particular sensitivity, often to the extent of the establishment of special command and control arrangements in parallel with, but separate from, normal state or military channels.

7

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