We do so in this Chapter. This has allowed us to form an overall judgement of the UK’s performance in obtaining intelligence on the nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile programmes of a wide range of states and on sources of proliferation, whether by states or by trading networks. Given its significance for the activities of some states, we open this Chapter with the AQ Khan network.
Many of these countries remain of concern. Sensitive intelligence operations and diplomatic activity are continuing. So the information we include in this Report must necessarily be limited. But in some cases declarations by the countries concerned, and statements by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other bodies about the results of their activities, have made it possible to judge the work of the intelligence agencies against what is now known. (Indeed, the extent and accuracy of the knowledge gained by the intelligence agencies were in some cases significant factors in persuading the states concerned to abandon their covert programmes.) Although our Review has gone more broadly, we have deliberately chosen to report only on those cases where information about the extent of states’ programmes or of illicit trading activity is now publicly available, so that comparison can be made with the judgements in prior intelligence assessments without damage to continuing operations.
We draw out broad Conclusions at the end of this Chapter.
2.2 AQ KHAN
AQ Khan directed Pakistan’s nuclear programme for 25 years and is known as the ‘father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb’. After studying in Europe, Khan worked for a company involved with the construction of an enrichment facility in the Netherlands. In 1976, he obtained Dutch and German designs for uranium centrifuges and took them to Pakistan. Based on these designs, Khan built a uranium enrichment facility at Khan Research Laboratories, where he successfully produced enough highly enriched uranium for Pakistan to test its first nuclear device in 1998. Khan subsequently exploited the supply network he developed to support the Pakistani programme in order to sell nuclear
COUNTRIES OF CONCERN OTHER THAN IRAQ AND GLOBAL TRADE
Our terms of reference require us:
To investigate the intelligence coverage available on WMD programmes of countries of concern and on global trade in WMD,taking into account what is now known a bout these programmes.