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Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 14th July 2004 - page 40 / 216





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Dong, confirming intelligence that they were based on North Korean technology. Access to the Libyan missile programme has also confirmed earlier intelligence that the North Koreans helped the Libyans to develop an 800km-range Scud missile.



We have studied the steady flow of intelligence on North Korean proliferation activities. North Korea is a difficult target because of tight state control. But the intelligence agencies have co-operated closely to tackle this problem, with cross-correlation of intelligence producing a total result which has been greater than the sum of the parts. The intelligence agencies have employed a range of ingenious tactics patiently and skilfully to piece together an intelligence picture of North Korean activity. This has provided important insights that have enabled the British Government to take decisive action to limit the extent of North Korean exports of missile delivery systems.


Intelligence continues to contribute to specific actions against missile exports in the context of the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative, which provides a framework for international co-operation aimed at disrupting the proliferation activities of states such as North Korea. Intelligence on specific activities is vital to the success of this operation. Close co-operation with liaison services is also important and we have seen clear evidence of this in the work of the intelligence agencies.



AII four of the case studies we discuss were to a greater or lesser extent success stories. To a degree, that was inevitable – we chose those cases where intelligence about nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile programmes and proliferation activities can be discussed precisely because it has contributed to disclosure of those activities. But that should not detract from what has clearly been an impressive performance by the intelligence community and policy-makers in each case, and overall.


A number of common threads have become clear from our examination of each case. The first and most obvious is the powerful effect of exploiting the linkages where they exist between suppliers (AQ Khan; North Korea) and buyers (Iran; Libya; others) for counter-proliferation activity. It is in the nature of proliferation that what can be discovered about a supplier leads to information about the customer, and vice versa. The second thread flows from this - the powerful multiplier effect of effective international (in many cases, multinational) collaboration. This thread emerges, too, in the next Chapter, on terrorism.


Third, this is painstaking work, involving the piecing together over extended timescales of often fragmentary information. There are the surprises and ‘lucky breaks’. But they often come from the foundation of knowledge developed over several years. It requires close collaboration


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