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Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 14th July 2004 - page 52 / 216

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previously been addressed by separate bodies. It includes senior officials from the relevant policy departments, and the intelligence community.

144.

The Counter-Proliferation Implementation Committee (CPIC) is responsible for actions to put into effect the strategies and initiatives agreed by the CPC. Among its other functions, the CPIC co-ordinates more tactical or technical policy development and provides guidance on priorities for the work of individual Whitehall departments. Representation on CPIC is the same as the CPC with the addition of the Assessments Staff and HM Customs and Excise.

145.

When Ministerial decisions are needed, the usual practice is for the department which leads on the particular issue to consult its own Secretary of State noting the views of the CPC and CPIC. As appropriate, the responsible Secretary of State may consult the Prime Minister and other Ministerial colleagues.

146.

The Restricted Enforcement Unit (REU) is the working level group that acts on intelligence relating to attempted breaches of UK export controls or other attempts to supply sensitive items to countries of concern. It is chaired by the DTI and includes representatives of all CPIC member departments.

147.

The Official Committee on Strategic Exports (OSE) has a very broad remit and membership. It does not address specific counter-proliferation issues, but deals with general aspects of the control of exports and the licensing of military goods and other goods of strategic importance.

4.4 THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

148.

As we note in Chapter 1, proliferating states usually represent difficult targets for intelligence collectors, and weapons programmes are usually particularly difficult targets within them. Intelligence will as a result usually provide only a part of the picture, but the alternative is usually no picture at all. Countries of concern go to great lengths to conceal weapons programmes because they represent some of the most sensitive and secret work undertaken in those countries. For example, because procurement is illegal, they use networks of companies to conduct procurement; and production and storage facilities are often sited in remote locations.

149.

Intelligence performs an important role in many aspects of the Government’s counter-proliferation work. It helps to identify proliferating countries, organisations and individuals through JIC assessments, DIS proliferation studies and operational intelligence. It can help to interdict or disrupt the activities of proliferators either nationally or in co-operation with other countries. It can support diplomatic activity by revealing states’ attitudes to counter-proliferation or by informing the assessments of international partners. It can also support inspection, monitoring and verification regimes and on occasions military action.

150.

Intelligence can play an important part in enforcing export controls, particularly in relation to ‘dual-use’ goods and technologies. The ECO

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