Biological weapons (BW) and Chemical Weapons (CW) programmes have been hindered;
No Fly Zones established over northern and southern Iraq have given some protection to the Kurds and the Shia. Although subject to continuing political pressure,the Kurds remain autonomous; and
Saddam has not succeeded in seriously threatening his neighbours.
but also that:
Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass destruction,although our intel ligence is poor. Iraq has up to 20 650km range missiles left over from the Gulf War. These are capable of hitting Israel and the Gulf states. Design work for other ballistic missiles over the UN limit of 150km continues. Iraq continues with its BW and CW programmes and,if it has not already done so,could produce significant qua ntities of BW agents within days and CW agent within weeks of a decision to do so. We believe it could deliver CBW by a variety of means,including in ballistic m issile warheads. There are also some indications of a continuing nuclear programme. Saddam has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened.
We consider this part of the advice to be a fair and balanced summary of the most recent JIC assessments.
On the basis of that analysis, officials then considered two broad options for securing the objectives set out above - a toughening of the existing containment policy; and regime change by military means. Much of their analysis on those options is not relevant to the scope of our Review. But two aspects are directly related to Iraqi nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile programmes and options for dealing with them.
First, in the context of the policy option of toughening containment, the analysis noted amongst other things:
The need for full implementation of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, and the introduction in May 2002 of the Goods Review List, intended to focus sanctions exclusively on preventing shipments of unconventional weapons and other arms while allowing other business without scrutiny, in particular facilitating legitimate Iraqi commerce under the Oil for Food programme.
That unity amongst members, especially Permanent Members, of the United Nations Security Council would facilitate a specific demand for Iraq to re-admit United Nations inspectors: Our aim would be to tell Saddam to admit inspectors or face the risk of military action.
The need for tougher action against states breaking sanctions.